



2020

# COLUMBIA STRONG

**A CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW OF THE COLUMBIA  
POLICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO PROTESTS  
AND RIOTING ON MAY 30-31, 2020**



**PREPARED AND PRESENTED BY:**

CITY OF COLUMBIA POLICE DEPARTMENT

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The Columbia Police Department would like to thank the following leaders who not only have provided leadership during this tumultuous time, but who have also continued to support the department and its personnel:

- City Manager Teresa Wilson
- Mayor Stephen K. Benjamin
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- Councilwoman Tameika Issac Devine
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- Chief Dennis Tyndall and the West Columbia Police Department
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# INTRODUCTION

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The Columbia Police Department is a premiere law enforcement agency that is committed to principles of twenty-first century policing, progress, and excellence. Because the Department has long-since recognized the importance and utility of matters related to community policing, independence, and transparency, it has previously implemented and incorporated policies and procedures that foster integrity, stability, and progress. These same policies also help facilitate thoughtful, logical, and analytical review when issues arise that affect the Department and the community at large. Indeed, during the period of civil unrest in the City of Columbia, a substantial number of the demands and requests set forth by well-intentioned individuals and social justice groups largely mirrored changes that have already been successfully implemented to both the benefit of the Columbia Police Department as well as the communities we serve.

Reference to such pre-existing policy or procedure is not made to merely suggest that the Department is simply content with the status quo. To the contrary, the very existence of our modern policies should instead be taken as evidence that like any other profession and modern government agency, evolution and progress are welcome and encouraged. However, appropriate distinctions must be made whenever and wherever possible between the responses to violent protesters who created a clear and present danger to the health, safety, and welfare of our citizens, fellow officers, and community at large, versus the proactive and responsive actions and measures the Department pursued to safeguard our community and the law-abiding citizens who lawfully undertook to exercise their rights to peaceably assemble and have their voices heard.

History shall be the final judge of our nation's collective responses to social justice issues, especially in the unprecedented circumstances that surrounded the protests on May 30-31, 2020. The collective pressures and hardship imposed by a worldwide pandemic, in conjunction with the collateral stress associated with highly polarized political campaigns and events involving other police departments in select cities across the United States, created an environment that was prone to engender chaos, fear, and disorder. However, the Columbia Police Department shall always seek to be the tipping point that pushes the balance in favor of peace, justice, due process of law, and order.

This Department enjoys and significantly benefits from a diverse group of personnel and administrators who draw on their collective experiences to better serve our community. Accordingly, the Department has developed and maintained the resources that are necessary to conduct a thorough review of the events that transpired on May 30-31, 2020, as well as the fifty-one (51) protests that followed in June and July. Overall, we hope our citizens will be proud and find some measure of comfort that the Department—consistent with previously established policies and procedures—has and shall continue to avail itself of opportunities for critical and rational review, improvement, and progress. The officers and personnel within this Department shall continue to serve the interests of peace, justice, and due process of law, and we are grateful for the continued support of our community and elected officials as we continue to move forward.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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This review of the civil unrest in Columbia, SC on May 30–31, seeks to offer a transparent picture of the police response to the actions of a small number of protesters. Specifically, it outlines the unrest in order to better contextualize police actions, and offers an unflinching assessment of the deficits of the CPD response, with a view to improvement of those practices. The ultimate aim is to facilitate the CPD in better protecting and serving the communities in which we all live.

## THE NATIONAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR THE SOCIAL UNREST IN COLUMBIA, SC

Numerous factors likely contributed to the unrest in Columbia, SC in late May, 2020. Not only were we in the early days of a continuing pandemic, but there were a number of police-involved incidents that led to widespread protests across the nation. The majority of these protests were peaceful; however, many turned violent, fueling the already burgeoning climate of fear—whether of COVID-19 or encounters with the police. Columbia, SC was not exempt from this unease or the deepening social divisions that were emerging across the nation. Indeed, Columbia, SC was a microcosm: the police-involved shooting of Joshua Ruffin and the unsolved death of Knowledge Sims undoubtedly contributed to some local mistrust of the police, which was ignited by the police-involved death of George Floyd in Minneapolis on May 25, 2020. Floyd's death was the catalyst for protests and rioting across the nation, including the civil unrest of May 30-31, in Columbia, SC.

## PLANNING AND PREPARATION PRIOR TO MAY 30–31, 2020

The Columbia Police Department did not receive notice of the protest planned for May 30, until May 29. Necessarily, this meant that there was an abridged planning timeline for this event. The organizers used social media to coordinate the event; however, CPD knew little more than what, when, and where the event was due to take place. This circumstance was exacerbated by groups applying for permits at the last minute or not applying at all.

Protests had historically been peaceful in Columbia, SC and the CPD underestimated the level of feeling within the community. Therefore, the CPD did not anticipate violence and was not prepared for the degree or speed at which the violence escalated. Although the department had Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams available and had coordinated with assisting agencies, they were initially obliged to react to a situation in an attempt to regain control, rather than pro-actively maintaining control.

## TRAINING

The MFF teams were under-prepared for the event. A group of officers underwent initial MFF training for the department to compose a couple of MFF teams approximately 3 – 4 years ago and, while there was some additional training since then, only new officers have received basic MFF training as they joined the department. The MFF has not conducted collective training as a unit since the initial training, which effected the quick organization and deployment of teams.

Moreover, the civil unrest also brought to light the need for the Command Staff and other supervisors to conduct more training for critical incident management or planning as a group, which to fully understand their roles and responsibilities during critical incidents. This caused delays in providing command and control, and logistics support planning.

## PLANNING

The department typically conducts abbreviated planning, and did not effectively use the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) to ensure comprehensive contingency planning took place with consideration of diverse threats, hazards, and events. This shortcoming, coupled with Columbia's history of peaceful protests, may have affected some tactical decisions such as, where barriers would be placed, and the identification of triggers for the deployment of various less-than-lethal munitions.

The written Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the May 30, 2020, protest was distributed the evening prior to the event, and contained broad incident objectives and command emphasis, as outlined in most of the department's previous special events. The plan did not adequately address objectives or work assignments which may have been avoided with the assistance of the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management. In the future the department will work with the Office of Emergency Management to ensure IAPs will better identify objectives, work assignments, and follow NIMS and ICS best practices.

Logistics planning did not contain the thoroughness required for integration into the IAP for contingencies. For instance, transportation for MFF personnel from the CPD Annex facility was not planned and logistical support, in the event that the event was to stretch into the evening and through the night, was not in place (ex. water, food). Again, historically peaceful protests and the condensed planning timeline are likely reasons for this.

However, the department demonstrated its flexibility and the close relationships it has with area partners by quickly coordinating transportation: It liaised with partnering agencies for the use of buses, as well as with the Columbia Fire Department, who assisted with transportation.

## INTELLIGENCE

The department generally has good intelligence focused on priority units, such as the Crime Gun Intelligence Unit. Normally, the SLED Fusion Center, the SC Bureau of Protective Services, and other partner agencies provide intelligence of threats or concerns regarding such events.

The department received notification about potential protests from the Fusion Center on May 29, 2020. Additionally, the department had only a limited ability to monitor the organization of these protests, as most were orchestrated using social media; moreover, late applications for permits and groups not applying for permits limits the time available to gather intelligence and the quality of that intelligence.

On May 31, 2020, the department redirected some of its intelligence personnel to focus on the protests, and increased coordination and communications with adjacent agencies, such as the Fusion Center and the Bureau of Protective Services. This redistribution of personnel meant law enforcement were able to better track officers, and also provided improved intelligence about what was happening in regard to the protests, as well as other, unrelated incidents/events.

## COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATION

Due to the infrequency of events of this nature, the Command Staff and other supervisors conduct training to fully understand their roles and responsibilities for incident management during critical incidents on a limited basis. This caused some delays in providing command and control.



Command and control continually improved over the course of the incident and for subsequent protests. Communications also improved as the department adjusted how Incident Action Plans were briefed, which improved communications. Additionally, the department decentralized some of its radio communications by adding a command channel to avoid overloading the personnel and unit communications. Command, control, and communication continually improved over the course of the incident and subsequent protests. It's also important to note that CPD's close relationships and collaboration with other agencies greatly contributed to the department's ability to successfully manage the events of May 30 and subsequent protests.

## POSITIVE TRENDS

CPD personnel demonstrated restraint during the protests by not reacting to provocation and violence. Moreover, they were extremely flexible when carrying out their assignments, displacing as and when needed in response to protester movement and behavior.

The department also effectively used new technology (the Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer, which provides a Common Operating Picture (COP) for Incident Command) to adapt to protest group actions. This helped improve tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The department has talented individuals throughout its ranks, and this incident put much of that talent on display. Several subordinate or more junior leaders exhibited excellent initiative to ensure success in department operations. These leaders understood the operational intent outlined by the Chief and other senior leaders, and took action to ensure specific tasks were accomplished.

## COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS/USE OF FORCE

The Columbia Police Department has strong relationships with the community and maintains clear and transparent communication as its priority. As daily protests continued, and community members voiced displeasure at police actions and demanded tangible change, it fell upon the CPD to assess their operations and policies to ensure these were in line with their espoused beliefs and responsibilities. Within two weeks CPD had reviewed and made significant changes to its Use of Force policy, which now prohibits the use of chokeholds or carotid artery holds, except in incidents in which the use of deadly force is necessary; per the department's Use of Force Policy, which has been in place since 2017, it has also been made clear to officers that they have a duty to intervene "to prevent another officer who is about to use excessive or unnecessary force or engage in other misconduct."

## KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

The department must begin the planning process as early as possible. The department should use the industry standard National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS) for Critical Incident and Special Event planning, and utilize the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management as a planning resource. This will facilitate the development of more effective Incident Action Plans (IAPs) and systematically improve the CPD's ability to respond to large-scale events, including civil unrest. A thorough threat and risk assessment should be incorporated into the planning process to protect personnel and equipment.

The department must put in place a contingency plan in case events occur at short notice. Command personnel, specific unit commanders, and planners, should collaborate and allow for as many eventualities as possible, including civil unrest. This would provide additional preparation time prior to an event, and would facilitate more coordinated operations.

The City of Columbia and CPD should continue to use the Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer. It provides a Common Operating Picture (COP) for Incident Command, and the capacity to develop and share IAPs with incident responders. The Alastar Incident Management Board, in conjunction with a more comprehensive IAP, captures events and provides more synchronized communications and effective inter-agency communication. The department should use Alastar cameras in conjunction with the City's Genetec and static camera systems to maintain a COP, as it did after the events of May 30-31.

The department should conduct regular training (e.g. Table Top Exercises, NIMS/ICS training, etc.) to ensure Command Staff and personnel understand their assigned duties and responsibilities. The CPD should assign Command Staff and personnel to appropriate event or incident positions and ensure they adequately execute their assignments. Rotating Command Staff and other leaders' assignments would expose them to different roles and build a broader base of interchangeable expertise.

The City of Columbia should also install permanent fencing around the CPD Headquarters and other designated facilities to provide necessary protection during future civil unrest incidents or other threats.

Staff must conduct thorough logistics planning and synchronization for critical incidents and events. The department's logistical staff should also develop a contingency plan for supporting critical incidents. This plan should clearly outline individual roles and responsibilities, as well as clearly delineated procedures for procurement and purchasing.

The department should ensure flexibility of command and control, such that it can expand and contract areas/functions, dependent upon the type of incident, the nature of the tasks at hand, and the hazards and safety factors in play. Optimally, there should be one supervisor to five subordinates (1:5). However, effective incident management may require ratios that are significantly different from this guideline, and personnel should use their best judgement to determine the appropriate ratio for an incident. The department must ensure the Incident Command Post is properly staffed for events and incidents since this is the hub for communications and coordinations, executing the IAP, and managing resources.

CPD should continue conducting IAP briefings with Command Staff and unit leaders to reinforce lines of communication throughout the organization. This ensures key decisions are clearly communicated to personnel.

The CPD should train and equip two Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams to ensure a swift response to incidents. Their pre-fitted and pre-issued equipment should be stored at CPD Headquarters to ensure a rapid response to incidents or in the event of officer recall. Further, CPD should plan and coordinate transportation for these teams. Command staff should familiarize themselves with MFF operations to be able to better direct and coordinate the MFF team.

The CPD should establish pre-determined decision points for deployment of personnel and triggers for specific actions, and incorporate these into the department's Use of Force policy or MFF policy, both as a guide for the deployment of the MFF and for the use of less-than-lethal munitions. These expectations must be clearly communicated to officers. Decisions concerning deployment and triggers for specific actions are determined by the observed actions of individuals and/or crowds, so leaders and personnel should closely monitor those actions in order to appropriately deploy resources and less-than-lethal munitions.

The department should clearly delineate responsibilities and tasks/purposes with the SWAT team, partner agencies, and other specialized teams within the department.

The CPD should continue fostering positive relationships with outside agencies to increase the ability for efficient coordination and collaboration, as was the case on May 30-31, and during the protests that followed.

The CPD should continue to be transparent and to demonstrate its bona fides to the City leadership and to the community such that, together, they can set aside the actions of a small group of individuals whose intent does not represent that of the majority. These relationships intrinsically benefit the community and the department, and facilitate a better understanding of the feelings within various groups in the community. As such, they could help the department gauge their planning and response in the event of an incident.

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# COLUMBIA POLICE DEPARTMENT: CIVIL UNREST CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE

On June 29, 2020, Columbia Police Chief W.H. “Skip” Holbrook formed a committee of Columbia Police Department (CPD) and City of Columbia personnel to conduct a critical review of the civil unrest incident that occurred during the protests in Columbia on Saturday, May 30, and Sunday, May 31, 2020. He directed the committee to report its findings to the Office of the Chief of Police in a written report, which would be published and available to the public to ensure transparency. Chief Holbrook directed that the report should include, but was not limited to: staffing, mutual aid, use of force, expended munitions, tactics, command and control, communications and equipment, lessons learned, mistakes, successes, and recommendations moving forward.

The Civil Unrest Critical Incident Review Committee consisted of the following personnel:

Captain J.P. Williams  
 Captain C. White  
 Captain E. Marsh  
 Captain K. Yates  
 Lieutenant B. Bell  
 Inspector J. Sellers  
 Investigator W. Petoskey  
 Master Police Officer (MPO) N. Gunter  
 Master Police Officer (MPO) W. Miller  
 Master Police Officer (MPO) R. Robinson  
 Director, City of Columbia Emergency Management H. Tinsley  
 Director, City of Columbia Safety and Risk Management D. Rumph

The committee met and collaborated often over the course of two months and developed the following objectives to guide the review process:

- *Determine what happened during the incident.*
- *Determine how we sustain or improve operations. Specifically, analyze Mobile Field Force (MFF) deployment and less-than-lethal munition deployment.*
- *Determine if the department conducted proper planning and preparation.*
- *Determine if respective policies, procedures, and directives properly address issues and concerns.*
- *Determine if there are policies, procedures, or directives the department needs to update.*
- *Determine if the department has a shortfall in training, specifically MFF training.*
- *Document less-than-lethal munition deployment during the incident.*
- *Analyze and identify personnel positions that did not conduct their required responsibilities and/or tasks, and/or did not display requisite leadership initiative to direct or complete necessary responsibilities and/or tasks.*

- *Analyze community engagement and communication to determine if there were opportunities to facilitate more open and transparent dialogue to prevent peaceful protests from turning violent.*
- *Address problems and concerns with policing in the community. Specifically, identify if there are opportunities/venues through which the department can better engage with the community to improve the acquisition of information and positively affect outcomes.*

The Civil Unrest Critical Incident Review Committee referred to the National Police Foundation's publication "How to Conduct an After Action Review" as a guide to conducting this review process. This document provided background information for conducting large-scale After Action Reviews (AARs), and contained a valuable a step-by-step guide.

The committee specifically used the Areas of Findings, Recommendations, Lessons Learned, and Promising Practices to organize the information. However, some areas have been removed or combined with others, which has allowed for an outline tailored to the department.

# THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTEXT FOR THE SOCIAL UNREST IN COLUMBIA, SC

## A Climate of Fear and Deepening Divisions

2020 has been a difficult year. Americans have had to face the effects of an unprecedented pandemic that has had ramifications on numerous levels. Not only has it claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, it has wreaked havoc with the economic and social foundations of the country. People have lost their jobs and businesses have failed at a rate never before seen. Additionally, sweeping measures restricting how we go about our daily lives have limited our social interactions and placed unavoidable limitations on our freedom to do as we will. And, as if this were not enough, the pandemic has been the backdrop for protests against racism and police brutality that have been taken up across the nation as certain disturbing events unfolded in different parts of the country. The results on a social level weigh heavily, and bring with them an undercurrent of fear, whether fear of illness or of police abuse of power. The result has been troubling discord and ever-deepening divisions within our communities.

It is important to understand what was happening across the country to gain a clearer understanding of why events unfolded as they did in Columbia, SC. There is little doubt that COVID-19 contributed to a general sense of unease across the nation; however, it is more difficult to ascertain whether the pandemic was a contributing factor to the unrest or whether protests took place despite the risk to personal health. What seems likely, though, is that COVID-19 did nothing to ease the general sense of tension in communities across the country, and likely heightened disaffection with local, state, and national leaders, who were themselves struggling to come to terms with how to deal with the novel Coronavirus and keep people safe.

What is clear is that a series of police-involved events led to widespread protests against police brutality and abuse of power. The shooting death of **Ahmaud Arbery** on February 23, 2020, in Brunswick, GA and the subsequent delay in prosecuting his killers, led to widespread outrage. Three armed, white men pursued and killed him after accusing him of thefts. Initially, no charges were filed against these men until the Georgia Bureau of Investigations conducted an investigation, charging the three men with murder almost three months later after a video of the shooting was posted online by one of the accused men.

A second incident took place just three weeks later. On March 13, 2020, three plainclothes officers from Louisville Metro Police Department, KY executed a search warrant purported to be a no-knock search warrant on **Breonna Taylor's** apartment. They were searching for two individuals suspected of selling controlled substances, one of whom had a previous relationship with her. Taylor's boyfriend, Kenneth Walker, exchanged gunfire with the officers believing they were intruders. During the gunfire, Taylor was struck eight times and subsequently died. In the months that followed, Taylor's family, friends and the local community called for an inquiry into her death and for the termination of the officers involved in the shooting. Between May 26 and May 29, 2020, protesters demonstrated at the Mayor's office and marched downtown in Louisville as part of a nationwide reaction to George Floyd's death. These protests recommenced in late September, following the Grand Jury's decision not to prosecute any of the officers with Taylor's death.

There were also local incidents that heightened tension in Columbia, SC. The first was the death of **Joshua Ruffin**. On April 8, 2020, 17-year-old Joshua Ruffin, a young African American male, was shot and killed by a white Columbia Police Officer, Kevin Davis. After a brief foot chase, Ruffin produced a handgun and pointed it at Davis, at which point Davis discharged his service firearm. Columbia Police

Department's Use of Force Policy requires that incidents resulting in serious physical injury or death be referred to the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) for investigation. This investigative process, along with the review process by the 5th Circuit Solicitor's Office, prevented the department from releasing information beyond basic facts until the overall investigation was completed. The investigative and review timeframe, coupled with the nature of the case, led to understandable public scrutiny and appeared to further heighten tensions between the local community and the police department.

**Knowledge Sims'** distressing and unsolved death likely widened the divide between the CPD and the community. On April 29, 2020, 7-year-old Knowledge Sims was shot and killed in his home in Columbia. His thirteen-year-old sister, Adontis Sims, was also shot and seriously wounded. Although Columbia Police Department and other agencies have appealed for information about the shooting and have offered a reward, they have received very few tips. The family and community have expressed frustration with the police department's response to the case, even though the department has exhausted all investigative leads and is hindered from bringing justice to those responsible until new information or evidence is found. These local incidents undoubtedly gave protesters more cause to protest and voice their displeasure with law enforcement.

The catalyst for nationwide protests, though, was the death of **George Floyd**, on May 25, 2020. Floyd, an African American male, was approached by Minneapolis, MN Police Officers on a call for service for possibly passing counterfeit currency. During the interaction between Floyd and officers, one officer, who was later identified as Derek Chauvin, a white male, was videoed placing his knee on Floyd's neck for 8 minutes and 46 seconds. During this time, bystanders pleaded directly with Chauvin to remove his knee from Floyd's neck, and asked other officers to intervene. In video of the incident, Floyd can be seen and heard repeatedly stating that he cannot breathe. Floyd subsequently died, with both the Hennepin County Medical Examiner, and a family commissioned second autopsy, undertaken by Dr. Michael Baden, finding that Chauvin's placing his knee on Floyd's neck contributed to his death. Chauvin was charged with third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter, and the other three former officers were charged with aiding and abetting second-degree murder.

### The First National Protests: May 26–29, 2020

George Floyd's death set off a powder keg. On May 26, 2020, Minneapolis, MN residents gathered at the site where George Floyd was killed and constructed a makeshift memorial. After these residents began leaving the area, more violent incidents erupted. The police responded by deploying less-than-lethal munitions to disperse increasingly violent and agitated crowds. These crowds became larger over the next few days. While the protests remained peaceful during the day, they devolved into violence and destruction at night. In some instances, individuals also began looting businesses.

On May 27, 2020, as media coverage broadcast news about the death of George Floyd and reported on the violence in Minneapolis, protests spread to other major cities throughout the US. Some cities imposed curfews and some states activated National Guard personnel in response to the growing protests and violence. The majority of the protests were still peaceful; however, small groups of individuals infiltrated the protests and appeared determined to instigate violence that invariably led to forceful responses from the police. In sum, at the national level the situation was barely under control, if at all. It is with this backdrop that Columbia, SC experienced its first mass protests.



# TIMELINE FOR COLUMBIA'S SOCIAL UNREST

## Columbia, SC: Friday, May 29, 2020

On Friday, May 29, 2020, the CPD received notification of a potential protest on Saturday, May 30, sponsored by *I Can't Breathe, SC*. The department contacted the South Carolina Information and Intelligence Center (SCIIC) to corroborate the information. SCIIC and SC Bureau of Protective Services (BPS) provided information regarding planned protests, marches, and gatherings which were to take place at City Hall and the SC State House.

In light of this information, the CPD conducted an abbreviated planning session with the Chief of Police and Command Staff in order to develop a plan for Saturday, May 30, 2020. The plan placed an emphasis on protecting the CPD Headquarters, since law enforcement facilities across the US had been targeted throughout the week by protesters. The Incident Action Plan (IAP) was distributed to department personnel at 6:08 p.m. on Friday, May 29, 2020.

## Columbia, SC: Saturday, May 30, 2020

**9:00 a.m.** On Saturday, May 30, 2020, at 9:00 a.m., CPD Officers met at the City of Columbia Emergency Operations Center (EOC), and were tasked with conducting traffic control and patrolling the downtown area on foot, on bicycles, and in vehicles. They were also tasked with managing crowd control and ensuring citizen safety. Focus areas included the City of Columbia City Hall, the South Carolina State House, and the CPD Headquarters. Officers were at their assigned locations by 9:45 am. The department's Mobile Field Force (MFF) team, a specifically trained unit of selected officers deployed in circumstances of civil unrest or critical incidents, remained in an on-call status at the EOC.



**Figure 1.** Protesters gather near City Hall on May 30 (credit - Chris Brathwaite, WLTX)

At approximately 10:00 a.m., Chief Holbrook initiated contact with the organizer of the *I Can't Breathe SC* protest. At that time, the organizer informed Chief Holbrook that both the "Hawaiian Boys," (later identified as the Boogaloo Boys) and the New Black Panther Party were providing security to the protesters. The protest organizer also requested that the police department provide traffic control as the group marched. However, he also asked for police officers to remain on the sidewalks because the Boogaloo Boys and New Black Panther Party members did not trust the police. Chief Holbrook agreed to assist with these requests.

**10:30 a.m.** At approximately 10:30 a.m., a crowd of protesters began assembling at City Hall. This crowd grew to approximately 300 individuals. At the same time, 50 protesters assembled along the sidewalk on Gervais Street at the SC State House.

The crowd of peaceful protesters at City Hall began moving south along Main St. towards the SC State House at 11:17 a.m., chanting phrases such as "I Can't Breathe" and "No Justice, No Peace."




**Figure 2.** Protesters assemble at the State House (credit - Lucas Daprile, The State)

At 11:35 a.m., the group arrived at the SC State House, and by 11:40 a.m., officers reported the crowd size had grown to an estimated 600 protesters. At 11:40 a.m., CPD personnel retrieved barricades from the CPD Annex facility to transport them to police headquarters. At 11:59 a.m., CPD SWAT met with other law enforcement teams at Segra Baseball Park. At that time, it was decided that the department's SWAT Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle would remain at the CPD Annex facility to avoid any appearance of unnecessary escalation on the part of the department.

At the SC State House, organizers, community leaders, and state leaders spoke to the crowd about racism, police brutality, and other social issues. The crowd size continued to grow during these speeches. At approximately 1:25 p.m., it was announced that protesters would march from the SC State House to the Columbia Police Department Headquarters. This was not disclosed to the department prior to this announcement.

### **Graphic Key for Police and Protester Actions (below)**



**Figure 3.** Graphic Key



*Figure 4. (I Can't Breathe SC March Route)*

1:30 p.m.

At 1:35 p.m., the crowd began to disperse and move north on Main Street towards the CPD Headquarters. The police department had established crowd control barriers using bicycle racks around the building. Based on the size of the crowd, the department requested additional support from the Columbia Fire Department.



*Figure 5. Protester March Route from the SC State House to CPD Headquarters*



**Figure 6.** CPD Officer talks with protesters at CPD HQs (credit - Chris Brathwaite, WLTX)

many of the protesters; however, the temperament of the crowd soon became more confrontational.

At approximately 1:50 p.m. the protesters arrived at the CPD Headquarters, positioning themselves at the crowd control barriers near the front of the building. Police officers in standard uniform were stationed along the inside of the barriers to maintain control of the protest line while allowing peaceful protesting to continue. These officers initially had some productive conversations with



**Figure 7.** CPD Headquarters Protest



**Figure 8.** Protesters gathered at CPD Headquarters

At 1:55 p.m. officers reported some of the protesters had started throwing bottles at officers and at Headquarters in general. Some of these bottles were filled with water, while others reportedly had a mixture of water and baking soda, which would supposedly serve as a decontaminant in the event of exposure to Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS Gas) or Oleoresin Capsicum (OC Spray).

In the early afternoon, Mayor Benjamin and Ms. Wilson, the City Manager, also arrived at the CPD Headquarters.

**2:00 p.m.**

The Mobile Field Force was sent to the police headquarters to assist at the crowd control barriers because some protesters were throwing glass and plastic bottles at the officers. One officer was injured when a portion of a heavy wooden police barricade was thrown at his head. The MFF officers had additional protective gear, including helmets and face shields, chest protectors, elbow and kneepads, shin guards, padded gloves, forearm pads, wooden batons, and riot shields. At this point, the protest crowd size was estimated at 400 protesters.

**Figure 9.** CPD Officer injured from Protesters throwing bricks, rocks and barricades



At 2:07 p.m., officers reported that protesters intent on harming them were spraying officers in the face with wasp or bug spray. SWAT Officers arrived at the Lincoln Street parking garage from the SC State House area to observe protesters.

Richland County Emergency Medical Service (RCEMS) arrived at 2:13 p.m. to transport an injured officer to the hospital. Officers observed that some of the protesters were becoming more aggressive. Protestors blocked the street in front of the headquarters by sitting in the roadway and parking vehicles in the road.



**Figure 10.** Protesters at CPD Headquarters

During this time, a protester previously observed throwing a water bottle at a CPD officer, climbed over the crowd control barriers and moved towards the front steps of the CPD Headquarters. He began showing signs of heat exhaustion and then collapsed. Officers immediately rendered aid, despite the fact that they continued to be struck with items thrown by other protesters. Officers carried the protestor into the CPD Headquarters for additional medical attention.

CPD MFF officers also began to suffer from heat related distress due to the hot temperatures and additional gear. Consequently, the department requested additional relief and reinforcements from the Richland County Sheriff's Office (RCSO) MFF at 2:49 p.m.



**Figure 11.** CPD MFF at CPD HQ

**3:00 p.m.**

At 3:10 p.m., protesters removed the American, South Carolina, and Columbia flags from the flagpoles in front of CPD Headquarters and set them on fire. This appeared to mark a shift in more aggressive actions by a number of protesters intent on violence.



**Figure 12.** Protesters remove the US and other flags at CPD Headquarters prior to burning them (credit - WLTX TV News)

By 3:50 p.m., officers reported that hostile protesters were throwing rocks and pieces of concrete at them.

Along Washington Street, between the headquarters and the Lincoln Street parking garage, a large group of protesters assaulted a man who was believed to be wearing a "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) hat.

An officer who was responding to the assault on Washington Street was also assaulted by protestors when they struck him with full water bottles and other projectiles, including a large chunk of cement or brick that caused a chipped bone fracture to one of his legs. During this confrontation, the officer defended himself using his baton and deploying OC spray at approximately 3:52 p.m. The officer was eventually able to position himself behind a WIS TV News vehicle until he could safely move to another group of officers.



**Figure 13.** A CPD Officer is accosted by a protester after being attacked while responding to a civilian attacked by rioters (credit – Lucas Daprile, The State)

At the same time, another large group of protestors left the front lawn of the CPD Headquarters and ran towards Washington Street where the officer was being attacked. While trying to determine if it was safe for his employees to report for work, the manager of Pearlz Oyster Bar was also attacked by aggressive members of the crowd who mistakenly believed he was calling the police. The manager was knocked unconscious and robbed.



**Figure 14.** CPD Headquarters Protest becomes violent

**4:00 p.m.**

At 4:01 p.m., officers continued to report rioters throwing large rocks and sticks. At 4:03 p.m., CPD MFF officers requested police vehicles enter the Lincoln Street parking garage on Washington Street to remove an injured officer. Due to the ongoing and escalating violence at the CPD Headquarters, the South Carolina Highway Patrol Advanced Civil Emergency Response Team (ACERT) organized at the corner of Gadsden Street and Washington Street at 4:05 p.m.




**Figure 15.** A violent protester vandalizes a CPD vehicle (credit - Tracy Glantz, The State)

At 4:06 p.m. the decision was made to disperse the rioters and aggressive protesters using white smoke, which is a non-irritant. The aim was to provide additional room for the MFFs to maneuver.

The deployment of white smoke was also intended to alert other law enforcement to the possible use of CS gas if the rioters did not disperse. The MFF teams dispersed the rioters and protesters south from the front of the CPD Headquarters to Washington Street.

At 4:07 p.m., it was reported that shots were fired towards officers in the vicinity of Gadsden Street and Washington Street. Officers also observed a protester firing a pistol into the air in the vacant lot next to the parking garage on the corner of Lincoln Street and Washington Street. Officers pursued the armed man eastwards along Washington Street and through a crowd of protesters towards Lincoln Street. One officer was able to grab the suspect's arm to place him on the ground. When the suspect reached into his pocket, the officer believed the man was drawing his pistol, and so the officer quickly drew his issued service weapon and commanded the man to stop. Officers then placed the man in handcuffs and recovered the firearm, which was underneath him. Later, shell casings recovered from the area were linked to the suspect's firearm.



**Figure 16.** Protesters burn vehicles in the parking garage at CPD Headquarters (credit - Thomas Hammond)


Officers also reported rioters were removing the barricades in front of the CPD Headquarters and engaging the MFF officers. This prevented MFF officers from assisting other officers who needed help. Therefore, CPD's SWAT team was dispatched to the area to assist at 4:10 p.m. They moved to the intersection of Washington Street and Gadsden Street to assist the surrounded CPD MFF team and an injured non-protester, who was at the Lincoln Street parking garage. Other assisting agency teams also deployed to the CPD Headquarters.



At 4:12 p.m., because of the escalating violence directed at officers and innocent bystanders, the MRAP was dispatched to the area around department headquarters to provide additional protection. Additionally, SLED reported that their armored vehicle was enroute to CPD Headquarters to provide additional protection to officers from projectiles and possible gunfire.

By 4:16 p.m., officers reported rioters and protesters had occupied all levels of the Lincoln Street parking garage across from the CPD Headquarters, thereby allowing them to look down on the MFF and other teams of officers in front of the headquarters, as well as those along Lincoln Street and Washington Street.

At 4:33 p.m., CPD SWAT arrived at the corner of Washington Street and Gadsden Street. The CPD MRAP arrived seven minutes later.



**Figure 17.** CPD MFF disperses protesters from in front of the Headquarters to Washington St.

**5:00 p.m.** By 5:03 p.m., the CPD Command Staff directed the Columbia-Richland 911 Center to contact all CPD sworn officers, specifically those off duty, and inform them that the department had placed them on a 30-minute emergency recall-to-work notification because of the rioting. At 5:06 p.m., another "Shots Fired" report was issued. The shots were fired from the Lincoln Street parking garage.

Shortly after at 5:17 p.m., officers reported rioters had spray-painted and vandalized at least three CPD police vehicles on Lincoln Street by breaking out windows, slashing tires, and destroying vehicle wiring. Rioters also stole property from these vehicles. Rioters then set one vehicle on fire, and CFD was dispatched at 5:21 p.m. to put out the fires.

At 5:30 p.m., CFD Engine 1 arrived on scene and attempted to maneuver north along Lincoln Street. Rioters tossed rocks, bricks, and chunks of concrete from the parking garage directly at the fire engine which caused broken windows and injured fire personnel. For safety reasons, CFD units were ordered to leave without addressing the fire.

At 5:37 p.m., Facebook Live reported a citizen was unresponsive on Lincoln Street. Further investigation revealed the citizen was struck in the eye by a piece of cement or a brick that bounced off the top of the police vehicle and suffered serious injuries. Early reports inaccurately claimed that the woman was struck by a police vehicle or less-than-lethal munitions. The rocks, bricks, and pieces of cement that protesters threw at the vehicle were also big enough to break the windshield and severely dent the car.



**Figure 18.** Protesters vandalize and burn three CPD vehicles



**Figure 19.** Protesters pelt a CPD vehicle with rocks and bricks injuring the lady wearing the red shirt (credit – Thomas Hammond)

Within minutes of the Facebook Live report, another officer was transported to the hospital for heat exhaustion, and another MFF officer was also injured and required treatment.

At 5:45 p.m., rioters set a second CPD police vehicle on fire, and Richland County EMS responded to assist a protester with an unknown injury.




Figure 20. Graphic showing protest incidents 5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.

6:00 p.m.

Mayor Benjamin announced a curfew was in effect for the downtown area of Columbia beginning at 6:00 p.m. At 6:10 p.m., as the police vehicles continued to burn, CFD requested the CPD MFF assist a Brush Truck Fire vehicle to safely reach the burning vehicles. Shortly after, at 6:18 p.m., CPD SWAT arrived at 700 Taylor Street to provide additional support as required. At 6:26 p.m., CPD officers also began moving vehicles from the CPD Headquarters to the CPD Metro Region Headquarters, to prevent rioters from damaging them.

At 6:42 p.m., three police vehicles were on fire along Lincoln Street in front of the Luther Lee Building.



Figure 21. In front of CPD HQs after the MFF pushed protesters to Washington St. with smoke from vehicle fires in the background



**Figure 22.** Sandler's Jewelry store after it was vandalized by protesters and rioters (credit - Jacob Reynolds )

At 6:46 p.m., it was reported that rioters had set another vehicle on fire on the second story of the Lincoln Street parking garage, and that they had also set fires on the east and west sides of the parking garage. At the same time, the department received reports that rioters and looters were breaking into the Blue Marlin restaurant and Sandler's Diamonds & Time jewelry store on the 1200 block of Lincoln Street.

These events, coupled with the emergency curfew imposed by Mayor Benjamin, triggered the MFF teams to disperse rioters from the Lincoln Street parking garage. When met with violence and refusal to disperse, law enforcement agencies used less-than-lethal impact munitions to clear rioters out of the parking garage.




**Figure 23.** Graphic showing law enforcement and fire department protest actions from 6:00 p.m. - 7.00 p.m.

**7:00 p.m.** At approximately 7:10 p.m., the rioters and looters began moving south along Lady Street. They broke out windows and lit fires at 1229 Lincoln Street. At approximately 7:20 p.m., law enforcement attempted to contain the rioters by establishing road blocks at Lady Street and Gadsden Street within the Vista Business District.

At 7:24 p.m., Chief Holbrook issued an order to begin arresting rioters and protesters for curfew violations. At 7:35 p.m., Columbia-Richland 911 Dispatch issued a Reverse 911 Emergency Alert to notify citizens that failure to abide by the curfew would result in citation and arrest. This meant anyone within the downtown area where the rioting was occurring would receive the emergency alert notification on their cellular phone.

At 7:45 p.m., MFF officers reported that the crowd was throwing bottles and glass at them at 900 Lady Street. One person was identified and arrested. As the crowd of rioters continued to display extreme aggression towards the MFF team, members of the CPD MFF were given orders to deploy white smoke (one, hand-thrown smoke grenade). This was done to move the crowd away from the officers. Rioters then ran east along Lady Street towards Park Street, where the crowd reassembled in front of the Carolina Western Pub at 920 Lady Street.



**Figure 24.** Graphic showing actions from 7:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m.

The MFF Commander requested that the CPD SWAT team provide security behind the MFF formation as it moved along Lady Street, dispersing aggressive protesters and rioters. Within a few minutes, CPD requested assistance with security as they attempted to respond to the reported fire at 1229 Lincoln Street, because protesters continued to throw rocks at the fire trucks and personnel. CPD SWAT provided officers to assist with security, and subsequently cleared the building to ensure no protesters and rioters were in the facility.

At 7:48 p.m., it was reported that rioters and looters were gathering items out of trash cans. Concerned the items would be thrown at officers or used to cause other damage to private businesses or city property, members of CPD's MFF deployed two 40mm white smoke rounds approximately 50 yards past the crowd of rioters assembled at Lady Street and Park Street. This failed to disperse the crowd, so members again deployed two 40mm white smoke rounds directly over the large crowd in a second attempt to disperse them. The crowd split into two smaller groups that moved approximately 50 yards from the intersection, assembling on opposite sides of the street at 1014 and 1015 Lady Street. These individuals jumped on top of parked vehicles and refused to leave.

At 7:50 p.m., the South Carolina Highway Patrol reported they were repositioning the ACERT team from Lady Street to prevent rioters from accessing the downtown area east of Assembly Street. Crowds of rioters and protesters continued gathering at Park Street and Lady Street.




**Figure 25.** SC Highway Patrol ACERT members regroup after protests and riots at CPD HQs

At 7:52 p.m., CPD requested assistance from West Columbia Police Department to close the Gervais Street Bridge, in order to prevent eastbound vehicle traffic from entering the downtown Vista area to protect protesters, non-protest citizens, and officers. Additionally, the South Carolina Department of Corrections bus arrived at CPD Headquarters to assist transporting arrested individuals to jail or MFF teams to various locations.

At 7:54 p.m., members of the CPD MFF deployed six 40mm white smoke rounds towards the two crowds of rioters and looters at 1014 and 1015

Lady Street, followed by six 40mm CS gas rounds. Several smaller groups of these rioters dispersed on Park Street and headed north towards Washington Street. The larger crowd of rioters reassembled and continued to move along Lady Street towards Assembly Street.




**Figure 26.** Graphic showing protest and riots from 7:48 p.m. - 7.54 p.m.

**8:00 p.m.** At approximately 8:00 p.m., most of the MFF team paused at Lady Street and Park Street while a small group of officers ensured smaller crowds of protesters continued to disperse along Park Street towards Washington Street. At the same time, CPD SWAT officers assisted with crowd control at Washington Street and Assembly Street because rioters were throwing objects at officers conducting traffic control. Additionally, the department continued to receive reports (8:02 p.m.) of rioters and looters vandalizing businesses by breaking windows at Washington Street and Assembly Street.



**Figure 27.** MFF with CPD MRAP in Vista (credit - Thomas Hammond)

At 8:06 p.m., the MFF and SWAT teams regrouped and began following the larger crowd of rioters and looters east along Lady Street towards Assembly Street. The MFF team came across a large crowd of rioters along the 1200 block of Assembly Street who refused to leave the parking garage. Members of the CPD MFF deployed two 40mm white smoke rounds towards the crowd; however, the rioters and protesters did not disperse. Two additional 40mm white smoke rounds were also deployed, followed by two 40mm CS gas rounds. This less-than-lethal munition deployment caused the crowd to split and disperse, with a smaller group of rioters and protesters moving north along Assembly Street to Washington Street, and a larger group moving south along Assembly Street towards Gervais Street.




**Figure 28.** Graphic showing protest and riots 8:00 p.m. - 8:06 p.m.

At 8:09 p.m., the MFF team stopped again at Lady Street and Assembly Street to assist the officers at Washington Street and Assembly Street, who were conducting traffic control before being faced with a small crowd of rioters and protesters who were refusing to move out of the intersection. CPD MFF and arrest team officers moved towards Washington Street and Assembly Street. As they arrived at the intersection the crowd of rioters and protesters separated and dispersed, moving east along Washington Street. They then turned south on Main St. towards the SC State House. They did so without the need to deploy less-than-lethal munitions. While at the location, a member of the MFF found a Molotov cocktail consisting of a 40 oz. glass bottle filled with gasoline, with a rag stuck in the opening to serve as a makeshift fuse. The Molotov cocktail was hidden behind an electrical box at the corner of 1300 Assembly Street. The officer removed the rag and emptied the gasoline from the bottle.

Between 8:12 p.m. and 8:16 p.m., officers reported three rioters running along Hampton Street and another ten rioters moving in front of the Washington Square parking garage. Law enforcement agencies continued to work together, and teams apprehended individuals for curfew violations and vandalism between 8:20 p.m. and 8:23 p.m. Other officers requested prisoner-capable transport vehicles to prevent self-injury to combative subjects who were attempting to kick out the windows of a patrol car.

At 8:24 p.m., another structure fire was reported at 1229 Lincoln Street, and at 8:26 p.m. CFD reported it had also extinguished a fire at 1321 Lady Street. A large crowd had gathered at the intersection of Assembly Street and Gervais Street stopping traffic, so a MFF officer and arrest team officers returned to the MFF team at Lady Street and Assembly Street, and prepared to move south towards Gervais Street.




**Figure 29.**  
Graphic showing protest and riot actions from 8:09 p.m. - 8.26 p.m.



At 8:28 p.m., the MFF team lined up across Assembly Street and moved south, encountering several small groups of rioters attempting to vandalize the windows of the BB&T Bank Building at 1201 Assembly Street. Members of the MFF team deployed two 40mm CS gas rounds towards this group, causing them to disperse and reassemble at the corner of 1100 Gervais Street. The MFF team continued moving south on Assembly Street, and one member deployed two 40mm CS gas rounds towards the crowd of rioters and protesters at the corner of 1100 Gervais Street. The crowd dispersed but reassembled with increased numbers in the parking lots on opposite sides of the 1000 block of Gervais Street. During this time, Police Command personnel coordinated traffic control in order to stop traffic at Assembly Street and Hampton Street, and directed the units in the Vista Business District to move towards Assembly Street.

At approximately 8:29 p.m. several subjects in the crowd of rioters at the 1000 block of Gervais Street attempted to instigate a fight with rival protesters, and CPD MFF members deployed three 40mm white smoke rounds towards the large crowd in the parking lot at Gervais Street and Assembly Street. The crowd of rioters and protesters did not disperse, and CPD MFF members deployed five more 40mm CS gas rounds towards the crowd. This caused them to disperse and move west along Gervais Street towards Park Street. A smaller group of rioters and protesters returned to the parking lot at Gervais Street and Assembly Street, and refused to disperse. Because of their refusal, one CPD MFF member deployed one Triple Chaser CS Gas Grenade towards the group. The group moved towards Assembly Street in the direction of Senate Street. At 8:31 p.m., an additional group of 30-40 protesters was reported in front of the SC State House, moving east on Gervais Street.

At 8:34 p.m., units were positioned at Lady Street and Assembly Street to conduct traffic control and to contain protesters. At 8:36 p.m., CFD also cleared the previously reported structure fire at 1229 Lincoln Street, and requested CPD personnel to secure the location due to damage from rioters and looters.




**Figure 30.**  
Graphic showing MFF dispersing rioters at Gervais and Assembly St.

8:37 p.m., the CPD MFF team split, with half of the team heading west on Gervais Street towards Park Street, while the other half maintained a perimeter at Gervais Street and Assembly Street. At 8:38 p.m., a fire was confirmed in the Carolina Western Pub (CWP) bathroom at 920 Lady Street and, as CFD units responded, they reported a crowd was throwing objects at the fire engine at Gervais Street and Park Street. This was at 8:42 p.m. CFD also reported gasoline on the floor of 1229 Lincoln Street at 8:47 p.m. and advised it was not on fire. At the same time, officers reported there were approximately 30 individuals violating the emergency curfew order at 1010 Gervais Street, across from Mellow Mushroom restaurant.

As one half of the CPD MFF team continued to move west on Gervais Street, several groups of uncooperative protesters were scattered around the intersection of Gervais Street and Park Street, preventing vehicles from leaving the area. The CPD MFF team Executive Officer deployed one hand-thrown Red Smoke grenade towards the crowd in an attempt to disperse them. It did not disperse them, so one of the CPD MFF officers then deployed one 40mm white smoke round towards the crowd, pushing them west on Gervais Street towards Lincoln Street.

At 8:50 p.m., in order to keep the vehicles out of the Vista Business District, Police Command directed officers conducting traffic control to turn all westbound traffic on Gervais Street onto Assembly Street. This allowed the half of CPD MFF team, which was securing the intersection, to rejoin the team on Gervais Street as it moved towards Lincoln Street. Additionally, a transport van was requested at Gervais Street and Assembly Street for arrested female protesters. At 8:51 p.m., CPD received reports of a break-in at Sylvan's Jewelry store on Main Street and Hampton Street, and CPD Metro Region patrols were directed to respond to the call. Within a few minutes, at 8:56 p.m., CPD received reports of possible unknown problems near Columbiana Center; however, CPD West Region officers indicated that this was a false report.



*Figure 31. Graphic showing protest and riot actions in the Vista 8:31 p.m. - 8:56 p.m.*

**9:00 p.m.**

CPD SWAT returned to the CPD Annex to retrieve their Tahoe vehicles for easier maneuverability, and to restock on water. At 9:04 p.m., West Columbia PD and Lexington County Sheriff's Department (LCSD) shut down eastbound traffic on the Gervais Street Bridge in order to prevent vehicles from driving into the Vista Business District. Additionally, a large crowd was reported moving to the parking lot at Gervais Street and Lincoln Street. There was also a report of a dark-colored Subaru with New York tags handing out crowbars in the same vicinity. At the same time, a crowd was reportedly attempting to break into the Cola Visitors Center at 1120 Lincoln Street.

The CPD MFF team continued moving west on Gervais Street to locate the crowd of protesters, which was standing in the intersection of Gervais Street and Lincoln Street, preventing a vehicle from leaving. Additionally, at 9:09 p.m., a large group of individuals violating the emergency curfew was reported in the alley of Jason's Deli, at 823 Gervais Street, moving south along Lincoln Street. A CPD MFF officer deployed two 40mm white smoke rounds and two 40mm CS gas rounds towards the intersection, causing the crowd to disperse and move south on Lincoln Street towards Senate Street. Half of the MFF team secured the intersection at Gervais Street and Lincoln Street to maintain the perimeter.

At 9:11 p.m., a small team of CPD MFF officers proceeded south on Lincoln Street towards Senate Street and reported the crowd of rioters and protesters were no longer in sight. This half of the CPD MFF team continued moving east on Senate Street, towards Park Street, without finding any protesters, and then returned west along Senate Street to find a small crowd had regrouped at the intersection of Lincoln Street and Senate Street, and was moving north towards Gervais Street. The CPD officers ordered the crowd to leave due to the emergency curfew, but they refused. The crowd was too close for CPD MFF officers to use 40mm less-than-lethal munitions, so they deployed a 9-Banger Flashbang grenade, which pushed the protesters towards Pendleton Street, out of sight. With no other protesters in view, the team rejoined the other half of the CPD MFF team at Gervais Street and Lincoln Street.

At 9:14 p.m., Police Command directed a marked police unit to block traffic on Gervais Street, at Huger Street, to prevent vehicles from driving east into the Vista Business District, and at 9:15 p.m. officers requested RCEMS at the Mellow Mushroom restaurant to check a suspect held in the police transport van for an unknown reason. At 9:31 p.m., it was reported that crowds of rioters and protesters were headed to the Columbiana mall, which later proved false.

After the CPD MFF team regrouped, it moved west, clearing the area along Gervais Street to Gadsden Street without encountering any additional rioters or protesters. It was reported at 9:38 p.m. that a large crowd of individuals was located at Monterey's Mexican Restaurant at 931 Senate Street, and later, at 9:52 p.m., officers reported a group of eight rioters were unsuccessful in their attempt to rush the police transport bus near Mellow Mushroom. These individuals then ran north towards the parking garage at Lady Street and Assembly Street.

At 9:50 p.m., CPD SWAT responded to the parking garage at Lady Street and Assembly Street as protesters and rioters had moved to that location. As SWAT officers exited their vehicles, an unknown suspect appeared from an upper level in the garage and pointed what appeared to be a handgun over the short wall of the garage. The suspect then began firing multiple rounds in the direction of the SWAT officers. The rounds were seen striking the pavement, and heard whistling past the officers, who took cover behind a short wall in the parking lot. Using the wall as cover, CPD SWAT officers quickly moved towards the parking garage in an attempt to apprehend the suspect. Officers entered the

garage and cleared each level as other units responded to the area. Only one individual was located. The suspect was detained on the second floor; however, he did not have a firearm in his possession. Due to the darkness and distance from the shooter, officers could not positively identify the individual detained as the shooter and he was subsequently released.

Based on the earlier report of individuals potentially moving back into the garage, CPD SWAT deployed to the Lincoln Street parking garage to clear the location. The CPD MFF team continued to move north on Gadsden Street, clearing the area towards Washington Street before regrouping at CPD Headquarters.




Figure 32. Graphic showing protester and riot actions 9:04 p.m. - 9.52 p.m.

**10:00 p.m.** RCEMS staged units at Gervais Street and Park Street at 10:00 p.m., while CPD SWAT continued to clear the Lincoln Street parking garage. They reported that they had found shell casings. The garage was cleared at 10:07 p.m. MFF and arrest teams continued to clear the area of rioters, detaining and arresting six individuals along the 1000 Block of Lady Street at 10:25 p.m. A Bearcat armored vehicle was requested at Assembly Street and Gervais Street for arrested individuals at 10:29 p.m. MFF teams, Kershaw County Sheriff's Department units, and police day shift units began ending their shifts between 10:45 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.



Figure 33. Law Enforcement Officers return to CPD HQs after dispersing protesters and rioters

## Columbia, SC: Sunday, May 31, 2020

The department continued to receive intelligence and information updates from the SCIIC from the early morning hours and into the beginning of the next operational period. There were two known protests scheduled for May 31, 2020. The “Peaceful Brutality Protest” and the “Protest—Black Lives Matter” were both scheduled to begin at the SC State House at 12:00 p.m. However, information about these events was limited, with organizers and supporters only posting flyers with the event name, time, and location.

The department and assisting agencies developed a more comprehensive plan than was in place the day before, to protect key facilities and to prepare to respond to violent protesters. To improve command and control and the CPD’s ability to respond, the downtown area and specific critical facilities were broken down into distinct areas, with respective senior CPD Command Staff members designated as commanders. These areas were: CPD Headquarters Command; CPD Downtown Area Command; and CPD SC State House Area Command. Additionally, specialized units continued to have designated commanders and deputy commanders, and other critical task areas had designated responsible command staff members.


**10:00 a.m.** At 10:00 a.m. CPD Officers conducted a roll-call and the IAP briefing at the City of Columbia Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Officers were tasked to conduct event security, to control traffic, to patrol the downtown area, and to observe protesters in order to identify potentially violent individuals. The plan placed a particular emphasis on the areas in and around the City of Columbia City Hall, SC State House, and CPD Headquarters. The department was also prepared to conduct Mobile Field Force (MFF) operations in the event of a civil disturbance. At 10:30 a.m. CFD staged personnel and fire apparatus at 1305 Lady Street.

**11:00 a.m.** At 11:30 a.m. CPD, RCSD, SLED, Kershaw County Sheriff’s Department (KCSD), and SC Department of Corrections (SCDC) teams and personnel, deployed to their assigned areas. This included CPD MFF teams staged at the CPD Headquarters, the EOC, and the CPD Annex. The CPD SWAT team was assigned to secure the parking garage at Lincoln Street and Washington Street across from the CPD Headquarters to prevent protesters from occupying the facility as they did on the previous day. The RCSD SWAT MFF and KCSD MFF teams were staged at Segra Baseball Park, along with the SCDC Rapid Response Team (RRT). Additionally, SLED and RCSD had their respective air units staged at SLED Headquarters and the Jim Hamilton-LB Owens Airport.

**12:00 p.m.** At 12:16 p.m., SCIIC indicated that the protest organizer from the previous day had posted information organizing another “I Can’t Breathe – SC” protest from 2:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m. at the SC State House. He invited Mayor Benjamin, Sheriff Lott, and Chief Holbrook to attend. SCIIC also indicated that this group had established a hotline for individuals requiring free legal services, bail, and for individuals who wanted to assist the organization. The group had asked that protesters leave the protest area by 4:30 p.m.

SCIIC also provided information for the “Jail Support + Rally: Free Them All!” protest, which was scheduled to begin at 1:00 p.m. at the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center. This protest was organized by the Party for Socialism and Liberation (PSL), and was intended to support the protesters who were “arrested yesterday [May 30, 2020] for protesting racist police terror in Columbia SC” by collecting donations to post bail for those arrested.

Protesters began assembling at the SC State House, and it became apparent that there were several different groups in the crowd. There were many peaceful protesters in the *Black Lives Matter* and *I Can't Breathe, SC* groups; these protesters were clearly seeking dialogue with the goal of combating institutional racism and societal injustice, as well as advocating for police reform. However, it quickly became apparent that there were less well-intentioned individuals and groups mingling in the crowd at the SC State House and in other downtown areas. They had been present the day before and appeared intent on promulgating chaos and promoting anti-government ideologies. These individuals variously represented Antifa, the New Black Panther Party, the Boogaloo extremist movement, and known criminal street gangs operating within the local area.



At 12:30 p.m. CFD Engine 1 filled water barriers at the Lincoln Street parking garage and at Washington Street, in front of CPD Headquarters, to prevent protesters and rioters from accessing the facility. This also provided additional protection for law enforcement personnel who were securing the location.

**Figure 34.** *Boogaloo Boys at the SC State House*

**1:00 p.m.** SLED air support reported a group of approximately six individuals at the apartment complex located on Lincoln Street, to the north of CPD Headquarters, moving towards the headquarters. The command post relayed this information to the CPD Headquarters Command at 1:14 pm. The Lexington County Sheriff's Department (LCSD) MFF also arrived, and staged at the CPD Headquarters at 1:16 p.m., providing additional support in the event of a civil disturbance, as well as increased flexibility in responding to incidents.

SLED aviation assets flew over the downtown area looking for potential threats and protesters. At 1:35 p.m., they reported a single vehicle, occupied by one individual, at the parking garage at Assembly Street and Lady Street. CPD officers were dispatched to identify the individual, and he was not determined to be a threat.

At 1:50 p.m., CFD staged the Medical Emergency Response Vehicle (MERV) 1 at the EOC to transport one of the CPD MFF teams, and to provide rehabilitation to personnel suffering from heat-related distress.

**2:00 p.m.** At 2:01 p.m., a police unit reported four males located on top of the parking garage at the intersection of Sumter Street and Taylor Street, and CPD officers responded to identify them. Within a few minutes, at 2:07 p.m., a large group of individuals was observed to the north of CPD Headquarters, in Memorial Park, at 1700 Hampton Street; they began moving from that location and, almost simultaneously, at 2:09 p.m., a large group of protesters left the SC State House grounds and moved north along Main Street. CPD officers blocked the intersection at Sumter Street and Gervais Street to ensure the safety of the group. Officers also moved with the group to provide traffic control.




**Figure 35.** Protesters March with CPD providing traffic control (credit - The State)

At 2:11 p.m., The CPD MFF team, which was staged at CPD Headquarters, began putting on their equipment in preparation to deploy in the event that protesters began rioting and looting. CPD officers moved towards City Hall at 2:12 p.m., so as to be prepared in the event of vandalism and violence.

At 2:23 p.m., the large crowd of protesters continued north on Main Street past City Hall and turned onto Richland Street, moving west towards the Governor’s Mansion. CPD officers informed Police Command that two males moving with the group were carrying handheld radios, which was another indication that their organization and communication was

better than the day before. Police Command anticipated that the crowd planned to go to CPD Headquarters to protest again, and that the group leaders may have misjudged the correct route to the headquarters after passing City Hall. At 2:28 p.m., SCIC provided another update, indicating that individuals were possibly planning to protest the Columbiana or Sandhill’s Malls; however, these reports later proved to be false.

The protesters continued moving west on Richland Street crossing over Assembly Street at 2:31 p.m. The crowd then reversed its course, returning to Assembly Street and turning south. At 2:32 p.m., a protester on Facebook Live stated the group was marching to CPD Headquarters. The protesters continued moving south on Assembly Street until part of the group turned onto Hampton Street, heading west to approach the north side of CPD Headquarters (2:37 p.m.). The remainder of the group continued south on Assembly Street, possibly intending to approach CPD Headquarters from Washington Street, on the south side of the facility.




**Figure 36.** Protester movement from 1:14 p.m - 2:44 p.m.

A CPD MFF team, RCSD MFF team, and the SCDC RRT team deployed to Hampton Street and Lincoln Street to form a protest line at 2:38 p.m., leaving other MFF teams and personnel from CPD, LCSD and KCSD prepared to deploy to the south side of the headquarters along Washington Street. At 2:39 p.m., SLED air support reported that the protesters who had continued south on Assembly Street appeared to be returning to the SC State House, and at 2:44 p.m. they confirmed that this group had turned east onto Gervais Street.

At 2:45 p.m., CPD Headquarters confirmed the Hampton Street group of protesters, numbering over 100 individuals, had arrived at the Hampton Street and Lincoln Street protest line. At 2:46 p.m., MFF personnel reported a small, crack-like explosion, which they indicated sounded like fireworks. At 2:47 p.m., CPD SC State House Area Command directed a unit to block traffic westbound at Gervais Street and Assembly Street because small groups of peaceful protesters were returning to the SC State House.

The protesters on Hampton Street began leaning on a crowd control barrier, and inadvertently surrounded a CPD patrol vehicle that was parked in the protest area on Hampton Street. CPD Command directed the MFF teams to push east along Hampton Street to clear the area around the CPD patrol vehicle. MFF Officers directed protesters, who were in violation of the emergency curfew order, to move back as the officers pushed forward to remove the vehicle; however, the protesters refused to move and became hostile. The crowd started throwing rocks, bottles, and an unidentified clear liquid at the MFF teams. The CPD MFF team Commander requested less-than-lethal shotguns with beanbag rounds at 2:48 p.m. As the protesters became more violent, the CPD MFF grenadiers were ordered to deploy two 40mm white smoke rounds on Hampton Street towards Park Street. The smoke from these rounds showed that the wind was blowing west along Hampton Street and back towards the MFF teams, and so did not disperse the crowd.

1:00 p.m.



**Figure 38.** MFF teams and protesters clash on Hampton St. behind CPD Headquarters (credit - Ben Breiner)

The arrest team identified an aggressive instigator who was throwing rocks; the team pulled him through the MFF line for arrest. This caused the crowd to become extremely aggressive towards the MFF teams, and protesters attempted to push through the line while the arrest team was attempting to put cuffs on the protester. Protesters threw a backpack over the MFF team. It landed directly behind officers, and CPD Command were concerned that it contained an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The bag was removed from the area and found to contain



only bottles. An assisting agency MFF deployed chemical agent grenades into the hostile crowd, and the rioting protesters picked up two of the canisters and threw them back at the MFF officers. At least one individual was struck with beanbag rounds fired from an assisting agency when he attempted to pick up one of these canisters and throw it back at MFF officers. MFF teams had not donned their formerly-issued protective gas masks, and officers at the front of the protest line were exposed to the chemical agent, which hindered their ability to respond; as a result, the officers began to lose control of the line as elements of the crowd pushed past them.

CPD MFF officers were therefore ordered to deploy Stinger Grenades to stop the aggressive crowd from pushing past the MFF. They subsequently deployed three OC Stinger Grenades which were effective, and the crowd backed off the MFF line. CPD MFF grenadiers then deployed three 40mm OC gas rounds and three 40mm CS gas rounds along Hampton Street, prompting the crowd to move eastwards, back towards Park Street. The crowd of protesters split into smaller groups as they continued to move east along Hampton Street, and then south along Park Street. Since the majority of the crowd had dispersed, MFF officers had the time to decontaminate themselves with the assistance of CFD Brush Trucks and personnel. The MFF teams then regrouped and continued to push east along Hampton Street towards Park Street, meeting little resistance. RCEMS was dispatched to Park Street and Richland Street at 2:56 p.m. to assist a protester who was possibly suffering from heat exhaustion. At 2:57 p.m., RCEMS responded to Park Street and Washington Street and transported a protester with a laceration to hospital.

At 2:51 p.m., officers advised that small groups of protesters from Hampton Street had moved



**Figure 37.** (Protesters behind CPD HQs (credit - unknown)




**Figure 39.** Law Enforcement deploys less lethal munitions to disperse violent protesters on Hampton St.



south on Park Street to the Aristocrat Restaurant, at 1001 Washington Street, and were using this location as a first aid and recovery station. Protesters continued to move away from CPD Headquarters. At 2:52 p.m., the CPD Downtown Area Command advised officers to remain at their assigned posts along Main St., as there were a number of individuals moving through the area.

**Figure 40.** Aristocrat Restaurant supporting protests (credit - Meg Kinndard, AP)


CPD officers originally assigned to patrol around the SC State House area, but who had moved with the protesters to provide traffic control, were directed to return to their assigned posts, because protesters were regrouping at that location. CPD MFF teams requested additional officers to respond to Hampton Street and Park Street at 2:54 p.m., as small groups of protesters were still moving through the area; however, the MFF teams did not have to engage with these groups.



**Figure 41.** Graphic showing protest group movements from 2:44 p.m. - 2:55 p.m.

**3:00 p.m.** From 2:59 p.m. to 3:19 p.m. SLED air support reported that protesters continued to move from CPD Headquarters towards the SC State House. Many of these smaller groups began reconsolidating into larger groups of up to 50 individuals as they moved. At 3:20 p.m., SLED air support reported that the protest group at the SC State House appeared to be dispersing or moving to another location. One of the CPD MFF teams staged at Park Street and Washington Street in anticipation of protesters returning to CPD Headquarters. However, at 3:21 p.m., SLED air support reported that these groups of protesters were lining both sides of Gervais Street in front of the SC State House.

At 3:25 p.m., the CPD MFF Commander requested a CPD unit to hold the intersection at Hampton Street and Park Street to allow the MFF teams to redeploy to CPD Headquarters. SLED air support reported groups of individuals were potentially moving north on Main Street at 3:35 p.m.; however, officers along Main Street advised that the individuals appeared to be dispersing. At 3:36 p.m., the CPD downtown area command reported that the SC Bureau of Protective Services (SCBPS) had told the protest groups that the event was supposed to be completed at this time, and that the individuals needed to disperse. Additionally, one of the CPD MFF teams was staged at Sumter Street and Gervais Street because some groups of protesters were moving around the SC State House area.



**Figure 42.** Graphic showing protest movements from 2:59 p.m. - 3.36 p.m.

#### 4:00 p.m.

At 3:58 p.m., officers reported receiving a tip that a white male wearing a red hat and other specifically identifiable clothing was near the SC State House, and was reportedly carrying a firearm. Within a couple of minutes, officers reported sighting the individual and, for safety reasons, agencies continued to track the person.

SLED air support reported small groups of protesters leaving the SC State House; however, a larger group still remained on site at 4:04 p.m. At 4:06 p.m., Columbia-Richland 911 Dispatch reported an armed robbery at 501 Gervais Street and provided the suspect's description. Officers patrolling the Vista Business District for the protest began circulating in an attempt to locate the individual.


At 4:11 p.m., officers around the SC State House reported a supporter of President Trump was antagonizing the crowd, and that a group of protesters were following the individual east towards Sumter Street and Gervais Street. CPD units were directed to block Gervais Street at Assembly Street and Sumter Street as the crowd spilled slightly into the street.

At 4:28 p.m., the CPD Bomb Squad Commander reported that SLED agents were checking a vehicle in the Lincoln St. parking garage in front of CPD Headquarters that contained a lot of Antifa materials. There was some concern that this vehicle might contain hazardous materials that had possibly been stored for later use by members of Antifa. This vehicle was determined to be safe. At 4:32 p.m., other CPD units patrolling the Vista Business District reported that they were investigating a suspicious vehicle behind the SC State Museum, which was also determined to be safe.

At 4:33 p.m., CPD SC State House Area Command reported CPD officers would begin dispersing protesters at the SC State House due to the protest permitted time ending and because the emergency curfew was still in effect. The crowd of approximately 250

protesters began moving west along Gervais Street towards Assembly Street, and then turned north on Assembly Street at 4:56 p.m. The crowd then turned east on Lady Street, and moved towards Main Street, where they turned north at 5:00 p.m. The protesters continued north on Main Street and turned west on Washington Street, heading towards the CPD Headquarters at 5:02 p.m.; however, at Assembly Street, the crowd turned south and proceeded along Assembly Street. At 5:05 p.m., the crowd again turned west, this time onto Lady Street, moving past Park Street before turning around and walking through the streets and parking area behind Mellow Mushroom on Gervais Street at 5:11 p.m. At 5:16 p.m., the protesters continued along Gervais Street to Assembly Street, where they headed south down to Pendleton Street, occupying all lanes of traffic. Traffic driving north on Assembly Street had to turn onto Senate Street and other, smaller side streets, or stop entirely. Due to the erratic movement of the protesters, SCDC RRT staged at Hampton Street and Park Street at 5:14 p.m. in case the group became violent. From 5:16 p.m. to 5:25 p.m., the large crowd of protesters circled the SC State House, moving east along Pendleton Street before turning north on Sumter Street, and then west again on Gervais Street, before arriving back at the front of the SC State House.

Additionally, 5:16 p.m., officers reported a crowd of protesters at Cantina 76, which is located at 1301 Main Street. This crowd subsequently dispersed; however, it was determined the business was used as a possible first aid and recovery station for protesters.



**Figure 43.** Graphic showing protester movement from 3:58 p.m. - 5:25 p.m.

At 5:32 p.m., protesters became hostile towards CPD officers located at the intersection of Gervais Street and Main Street. Protestors antagonized officers by aggressively gesturing at officers, repeatedly feigning an attack as a means to provoke a response; one male protester made indications that he had a large knife on his belt, with the intent of threatening officers. A CPD officer displayed a less-lethal shotgun towards the aggressive protester and crowd, and then deployed four, less-than-lethal beanbag rounds towards the knife-carrying individual. At 5:34 p.m., the CPD MFF Deputy Commander requested


the MFF team to deploy to Gervais Street and Main Street, and subsequently deployed one hand-thrown CS grenade towards the crowd to disperse them. A protester kicked the CS grenade back at CPD officers and, in turn, the CPD MFF Deputy Commander kicked the grenade back towards the protest group. This caused the crowd to split on both sides of the SC State House, with one group gathering along Sumter Street, and the other group remaining on Gervais Street.

The hostile protesters on Gervais Street continued to throw bottles, and the SC Highway Patrol ACERT team deployed from the SC State House to disperse them from the grounds at 5:36 p.m. At 5:42 p.m., CPD officers were directed to block traffic driving towards Sumter Street and Gervais Street because there was a large concentration of protesters in the street. The curfew from May 30, 2020 was still in effect, starting at 6:00 p.m. and lasting until 6:00 a.m. on June 1, 2020. Accordingly, the CPD Downtown Area Command directed units to disperse the protesters. At 5:43 p.m. officers began dispersing the crowd of protesters at Sumter Street and Gervais Street, and groups of these individuals began moving north along Sumter Street towards Washington Street, and east towards Marion Street. At 5:46 p.m., three individuals were observed on the Bank of America parking garage at Gervais Street and Main Street, and officers were advised to monitor them in case they were providing information to protesters about law enforcement positions and actions.



**Figure 44.** CPD MFF in front of the State House (credit - ABC Columbia)

As officers continued to disperse the crowd of protesters, a large group of individuals was reported on Washington Street, and another group was reported moving east along Marion Street through parking lots at 5:49 p.m. The Gervais Street group of protesters began dispersing and reconsolidating at Gervais Street and Assembly Street. The Washington Street group continued to move west, before turning onto Main Street at 5:50 p.m. At 5:55 p.m., SLED air support reported a camera crew was located on top of the parking garage at Washington Street and Assembly Street, and CPD directed downtown officers to investigate. These individuals were identified and determined not to be a threat.



**Figure 45.** Graphic showing protest and riot actions from 5:32 p.m. - 5.49 p.m.

**6:00 p.m.** At 5:58 p.m. Chief Holbrook requested Police Command to coordinate with West Columbia PD (WCPD), Cayce PD, and the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department (LCSD) to shut down traffic moving west into downtown Columbia at the Gervais Street Bridge and the Blossom Street Bridge.

At approximately 6:00 p.m. CPD officers attempted to stop a suspicious male in the Vista Business District. He fled and a foot chase ensued. The suspect was detained at 6:02 p.m. after he discarded a pistol with a 30 round magazine drum of ammunition.



**Figure 46.** CPD Officers chase an individual reportedly armed during protests on May 31, 2020 (credit: Jason Lee - Associated Press)

At 6:07 p.m., as a crowd of protesters from Gervais Street and Assembly Street moved into the Vista Business District, Chief Holbrook directed officers at Sumter Street and Gervais Street to move to the intersection of Pendleton Street and Assembly Street to disperse protesters. Additionally, he told officers to stop northbound and westbound traffic at this intersection, while other officers and MFF teams moved west along Pendleton Street towards the river. At 6:12 p.m., as law enforcement worked to disperse and clear protesters, Chief Holbrook directed CPD officers to stop southbound and westbound traffic at Assembly Street and Washington Street to prevent individuals from driving into the protest area. At 6:14 p.m., Chief Holbrook also directed a unit to stop


eastbound traffic at Gervais Street and Huger Street to prevent individuals from driving into the Vista Business District, where protesters were entering.



**Figure 47.** A 19 year old man was arrested during protests on May 31, illegally carrying this handgun and 70 rounds of ammunition

At 6:16 p.m., MFFs from CPD, RCSO, SCDC, LCSO, and Kershaw County Sheriff's Office (KCSO) began moving west along Pendleton Street, Senate Street, Gervais Street, and Lady Street to disperse and clear protesters from the Vista Business District and downtown area. This went on for the next 33 minutes. Law enforcement arrested 16 individuals related to curfew or protest related issues. The CPD MFF Deputy Commander advised the CPD SC State House Area Command to open Gervais Street at Assembly Street; he also advised Police Command that WCPD, LCSD, and Cayce PD could open the bridges at Gervais Street and Blossom Street. All MFF teams and downtown area officers

returned to the CPD Headquarters at 6:57 p.m. to consolidate and recuperate prior to demobilizing. At 7:42 p.m. incident command was terminated.



**Figure 48.** Graphic showing protester and law enforcement actions from 5:49 p.m. - 7:42 p.m.

## DAMAGE AND INJURIES

Through the two initial days of civil unrest, aggressive protesters attacked and destroyed vehicles and facilities. They also injured several officers, personnel from assisting agencies, and civilians. These violent protesters showed they had no regard for the safety of personnel, or for property, whether it belonged to the city or otherwise.

The damage and injuries incurred caused significant supplemental costs to City of Columbia taxpayers, as well as business and property owners. As one might expect, overtime costs for officers, other city employees, and our partnering agencies, increased. There was also a cost above and beyond the monetary loss. The behavior of a few undoubtedly affected the many: it not only distracted from the message of the large numbers of peaceful protesters, but inevitably reinforced misperceptions about law enforcement. Their behavior, to which law enforcement was obliged to respond, has further hindered productive communication with the community at large, and with community action groups in particular, this notwithstanding the fact that both groups typically have common goals.



**Figure 49.** CFD Fire fighters work to extinguish CPD vehicle fires while MFF provide security (credit - Tracy Glantz, The State)

### DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

The City of Columbia suffered damage to 24 vehicles in total, incurring \$160,500 costs in damage to vehicles alone. Thirteen CPD vehicles were impacted, with the damage ranging from broken windows to being destroyed by fire. Columbia Municipal Court had the windows broken out of two vehicles, and one was spray-painted. Similarly, Columbia Parking Division had windows broken out of five vehicles, three of which were spray-painted. Finally, two Columbia Fire Department trucks were damaged: two engines had windows broken and significant damage was done to the bodywork of these vehicles; and one ladder truck also received damage to the bodywork of the vehicle.



**Figure 50.** An injured CPD Officer is helped to a vehicle for transport to the hospital (credit - Tracy Glantz, The State)

### INJURIES TO PERSONNEL

There were a variety of injuries to personnel as a result of the unrest. Four officers suffered heat stroke and ten officers and two firefighters were injured by flying objects, including four officers who were hit by bricks or pieces of wooden barricades that were destroyed. Rioters caused a chipped bone fracture to one officer's leg by throwing concrete at him. Two officers were assaulted with wasp spray and another two were spat at with blood. Finally, four officers were injured by their gear. It's also important to note that this account of injuries does not include personnel injured from partner or assisting agencies.




# ARRESTS AND INVESTIGATIONS

The CPD, partnering with RCSD and Sled, immediately began investigating the violent protesters and rioters who disrupted the original peaceful protest. A team of investigators combed through numerous hours of officer body-worn camera and other video footage to identify those individuals responsible for maliciously injuring peaceful protesters, bystanders, and officers, and to identify those who deliberately vandalized and damaged businesses, personal property, and government facilities and equipment.


These suspects were either identified with the help of Crimestoppers tips or through investigative teams from CPD, RCSD, and the SC Law Enforcement Division (SLED). The United States Marshals Service also assisted CPD and RCSD in locating and arresting several of these suspects.

In all, 90 suspects were arrested for 203 alleged crimes that were committed on May 30 -31, 2020, at either Columbia Police Headquarters – #1 Justice Square, 400 Assembly Street (Green’s Beverage Outlet), the corner of Main and Gervais Streets, 920 Lady Street (Carolina Western Pub), and the 800 block Hampton Street.




**Figure 51.** *Dates of arrest*

While 73 of these suspects provided Columbia area addresses, and 12 suspects provided addresses within South Carolina, five suspects were from out of state. Thus, 19% of the suspects were not from the Columbia area, and this number appears to indicate the presence of elements intent on inciting normally peaceful protesters to riot and become violent. This outside presence could well indicate a broader and divisive intention to sow mayhem and derail peaceful protests and meaningful communication.



**Figure 52.** Arrest suspect residency

The graph listed below outlines the charges filed for these 90 individuals, some of whom were charged with more than one crime.



**Figure 53.** May 30-31, Civil Unrest charges

\*\*This information is subject to change as additional individuals are possibly arrested, or charges are added or dropped as investigations progress.

# USE OF FORCE

On May 30 and May 31, 2020, CPD Officers used varying levels of force, ranging from soft, empty-hand control of protesters, to deploying less-than-lethal munitions to disperse crowds or gain control over non-compliant individuals.

The MFF Commander directed MFF officers, if necessary, to initially deploy white smoke if the decision was made to use less-than-lethal munitions. This accomplished several things: It was used to determine the wind direction in case chemical irritants were subsequently needed, and it provided a signal to all personnel that less-than-lethal munitions were likely being deployed. It also gave protesters the opportunity to de-escalate and disperse without exposure to chemical irritants or higher-impact weapons. If the crowd still did not disperse, the MFF would consider deploying Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) gas and/or Chlorobenzalmalonitrile (CS) gas in order to gain compliance from protesters, and to reduce injuries to both protesters and officers. Ultimately, it would be the response from protesters—peaceful or otherwise—that would determine if any use of force would be deemed necessary.

As the behavior of instigators in the large crowd continued escalating, the instigators also caused injuries to officers and others and damaged vehicles and property, including setting fire to police vehicles. For that reason, the department made the decision to move the remaining protesters from the front of CPD Headquarters to Washington Street. The MFF deployed white smoke in an effort to disperse the crowd and to stop the violence from escalating further. The push did have the short-term effect of moving some protesters. However, the more aggressive individuals remained in the immediate area or began moving into the Vista Business district.

When protesters began moving along Lincoln Street into the Vista Business district to vandalize and loot businesses and buildings, the Mayor and City Council instituted a curfew in the downtown area. The department directed the Columbia-Richland 911 Dispatch to issue a Reverse 911 Emergency alert, advising individuals to go home or risk arrest for curfew violations. As it became apparent that the more aggressive protesters did not plan to adhere to the curfew or stop their violent behavior, the MFF teams were deployed to clear the area. This was done to restore order, ensure the safety of individuals, and to protect property.

The following tables outline the deployment of less-than-lethal munitions that includes non-irritant smoke, Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) gas and/or Chlorobenzalmalonitrile (CS) gas, and Direct Fired SIM (Specialty Impact Munitions), which is also often referred to as Beanbag Shotgun Rounds.

## May 30, 2020 - CPD Expended Gas, Smoke, and Beanbag Rounds

Total	White Smoke (Hand Thrown)	White Smoke (40mm)	CS Gas (40mm)	CS Triple Chaser Grenade	Red Smoke (Hand Thrown)	9-Banger Flashbang Grenade	Beanbag Shotgun Rounds
42	2	18	18	2	1	1	2

### May 31, 2020 - CPD Expended Gas, Smoke, and Beanbag Rounds

Total	White Smoke (Hand Thrown)	White Smoke (40mm)	CS Gas (40mm)	OC Stinger Grenades	OC Gas (40mm)	CS Gas (Hand Thrown)	Beanbag Shotgun Rounds
12	0	2	3	3	3	1	9

## USE OF FORCE POLICY AND IMMEDIATE CHANGES

The City of Columbia and the Columbia Police Department recognize and respect the value and sanctity of each human life and, therefore, emphasizes the importance of treating all persons with dignity and respect. Vesting officers with the lawful authority to use force to protect the public welfare requires a careful balancing of all human interests. Therefore, it is the policy of the City that officers shall use only the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish their lawful objectives. The use of any level of force carries with it the responsibility to render appropriate medical aid if needed. Moreover, officers have a duty to intervene, whether to prevent another officer who is about to use excessive or unnecessary force, or engage in other misconduct.

The application of deadly force is a measure to be employed only in the most extreme circumstances if other lesser means of force have failed, or if they could not be reasonably employed under the totality of the circumstances. A police officer may only use deadly force when:

**He/she believes the force is objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances; or, that such force is necessary to protect him/her or others from the imminent danger of serious physical injury or death.**

**OR**

**To prevent the escape of a fleeing felon who the police officer reasonably believes, based upon the totality of the circumstances, is attempting to escape by means of a deadly weapon; or, who, by conduct or other means, indicates that he presents an imminent threat of serious physical injury or death to others unless apprehended without delay.**

Use of Less-Than-Lethal Force is authorized where deadly force is not justified. Police officers will evaluate the totality of the circumstances in order to determine which approved weaponless control techniques and/or less-than-lethal weapons may most reasonably de-escalate the incident and bring the situation under control in a safe manner.

Police officers are authorized to use less-than-lethal techniques and/or weapons to:

- *Protect themselves or others from physical harm.*
- *Restrain or subdue a resistant individual.*
- *Bring an unlawful situation safely and effectively under control.*

## Use of Force Reporting Process

The CPD had 25 Use of Force incidents on May 30-31, 2020. Each of these incidents were documented and reviewed to ensure policy compliance. Because of the chaotic situation during these two days, and the meticulous analysis of these events, the department acknowledges that it has taken longer than normal to investigate these incidents.

In general, any Use of Force incident resulting in serious physical injury or death are immediately referred to the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) by the Chief of Police or his designee for investigation. During the period of civil unrest, the department did not have any Use of Force incidents that met these criteria.

CPD's Professional Standards Division and the Training Unit also conduct an annual analysis of all Use of Force packets to determine if patterns or trends exist that could indicate training needs, equipment upgrades, and/or policy modifications. The results of this analysis is forwarded to Chief of Police, who makes the results public through an annual report to City Council. In this case, the department did not wait to conduct an annual analysis. It immediately began reviewing the incidents and its policy to determine and implement necessary changes.

## Less-than-Lethal Shotgun/Impact Munitions

The department used less-than-lethal shotguns with less-than-lethal specialty-impact munitions over the course of the two days of civil unrest. Some of the public expressed concerns regarding the use of these weapons and munitions which further highlighted the importance of a thorough and transparent review of policies and officer actions.

The CPD policy states:

**Less-than-lethal specialty impact weapons that are designed to be directly fired at a specific target ("Direct Fired SIM (Specialty Impact Munitions)'), including but not limited to flexible batons ("bean bags"), shall not be used for crowd management, crowd control, or crowd dispersal during demonstrations or crowd events.**

Moreover, Direct Fired SIM shall only be used against a specific individual who is engaging in conduct that poses an immediate threat of loss of life or serious bodily injury to themselves, officers, or the general public, when other means of arrest are unsafe; or against a specific individual who is engaging in substantial destruction of property which creates an imminent risk to the lives or safety of other persons, and only when the individual can be targeted without endangering other crowd members or bystanders.

Additionally, Direct Fired SIM may never be used indiscriminately against a crowd or group of persons, even if some members of the crowd or group are violent or disruptive.

During the period of civil unrest, three CPD officers deployed a total of eleven Direct Fire SIM (“bean bags”) over the course of two days. After reviewing the Use of Force in each of these instances, it has been determined that all three officers were in compliance with the department’s Use of Force Policy. In each instance, the officer targeted specific individuals who he/she reasonably believed were engaging in conduct that posed an immediate threat of loss of life or serious bodily injury to themselves, officers, or the general public; or against an individual who was engaging in substantial destruction of property creating an imminent risk to the lives or safety of other persons. Officers determined during each incident that other means of arrest were unsafe. Each individual was actively or attempting to target officers by throwing rocks or other hard, dangerous objects, by throwing smoke or other less-than-lethal munitions back at officers, or by gesturing or otherwise indicating their intent to assault officers.

It is important to emphasize that the department’s policies at the time outlined guidelines and actions for peaceful protests. Those policies do not address, and simply do not apply in, situations involving active violence against the citizens of this city or the police department. The policies also do not address situations in which an emergency curfew is enacted. Here, the City of Columbia’s Emergency Curfew was in place continuously from the evening of May 30, 2020 until the morning of June 1, 2020.

## Policy Changes

Since the period of civil unrest, the department has re-evaluated its Use of Force Policy, and the City of Columbia City Council unanimously passed an updated policy on June 16, 2020. The updated policy specifically prohibits the use of carotid artery holds and choke holds, unless deadly force is deemed necessary. To further clarify what constitutes a carotid artery hold and a choke hold, the City has provided the following definitions:

- **Carotid Artery Hold (“sleeper hold or “v” hold):** *Any technique which is applied to an effort to control or disable a person by applying pressure or force to the carotid artery or the jugular vein or the sides of the neck with the intent or purpose of controlling a person’s movement by constricting the flow of blood to and from the brain.*
- **Choke hold:** *A physical maneuver that restricts an individual’s ability to breathe for the purposes of incapacitation.*

The updated policy also reiterated that every officer has a duty to intervene to prevent a fellow officer who is about to use or is using excessive or unnecessary force, or is engaging in other misconduct, even though this has been the department’s policy for several years.

Additionally, the department has updated its policy on “no-knock” warrants to clearly reflect that these types of warrants are not part of its policing methodology. These types of warrants allow government officials to enter a dwelling or other building without complying with the traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. This policy is in keeping with the well-publicized decision handed down by South Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Beatty, who ordered a moratorium on Circuit Court and Municipal Court Judges issuing “no-knock” warrants.

The Columbia Police Department continues to review its policies to ensure they are in line with 21st century policing and best practices. Moreover, the department is in the process of separating the deployment of less-than-lethal munitions during civil unrest events from the Use of Force policy into its own specific policy to provide better guidance to officers. The expectation is to safeguard not only officers, non-violent community members expressing their First Amendment rights, and property, but

to also ensure appropriate, measured force is applied to bring dangerous and unlawful civil unrest situations under control. It remains our intent to ensure the safety of members of the community and our officers by appropriately training and applying the proper tools and procedures when there is a threat of harm to others.

The department's review of its policies, specifically its Use of Force policy, will not end with these incidents or this report. We are committed to an ongoing and proactive process of review, driven both internally, as incidents arise, and externally, as our judicial system reviews case law to ensure equitable enforcement of the constitutional protections afforded to our citizens. These policy reviews must and will be transparent so that we can build and maintain the trust of the community and those we serve.

# AREAS OF REVIEW

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Over the last several months, the committee has examined all available information regarding the period of civil unrest. The goal throughout the process was to critically analyze the incident and the department's response and provide recommendations to improve any future responses.

The committee then made recommendations and outlined action plans. Of note, the committee found that many of their recommendations related to improving the flow of information throughout the department during similar events. That information deficit rendered the department's response reactive rather than proactive. The committee did not investigate or assess the costs attached to their recommendations. It is incumbent on the CPD to determine which recommendations are feasible and cost-effective. This process will require careful assessment of the questions raised and careful examination of the proposed solutions. Our resolve is to continue to improve our operations so that we can better serve our community. As such, the CPD is fully committed to this review process.

In order for the CPD to prioritize recommendations within its action plans, the recommendations were organized by: Immediate, Near-term, or Long-term. While there are no specific timeframes associated with these, it is suggested that the Immediate Recommendations are those actions the department should consider accomplishing within the next six months. Near-term Recommendations are those actions the CPD should consider accomplishing within six months to one year, and Long-term Recommendations are those actions for consideration after one year. As mentioned earlier, a more comprehensive assessment is warranted to ensure these are feasible and cost-effective before the department can fully consider implementing this action plan.

The Civil Unrest Critical Incident Review Committee referred to the National Police Foundation's publication "How to Conduct an After Action Review" as a guide to conducting this review process. This document provided background information for conducting large-scale After Action Reviews (AARs), and contained a valuable step-by-step guide.

The committee specifically used the Areas of Findings, Recommendations, Lessons Learned, and Promising Practices to organize the information. However, some areas have been removed or combined with others, which has allowed for an outline tailored to the department.



## Civil Unrest Committee Areas of Review and Findings

### Area of Review: 1. Planning, Preparation, Policy, and Procedure

Finding 1.1: Event Planning - Timeline and Understanding the Operational Environment.

Finding 1.2: Event Planning - Incident Action Plan

Finding 1.3: Event Planning - Planning Team and Subject Matter Experts

Finding 1.4: Event Planning - Terrain Considerations

Finding 1.5: Event Planning - Decision Points/Action Triggers

Finding 1.6: Event Planning - Logistics

Finding 1.7: Event Planning - Mobile Field Force Equipment

Finding 1.8: Event Planning - Transportation

Finding 1.9: Event Planning - Removing Vehicles and Equipment from Protest Areas

Finding 1.10: Event Planning - Risk Assessment and Threat Mitigation

### Area of Review: 2. Executive Direction (Leadership, Coordination, and Collaboration)

Finding 2.1: Executive Direction - Leadership

Finding 2.2: Executive Direction - Coordination

Finding 2.3: Executive Direction - Collaboration

### Area of Review: 3. Training

Finding 3.1: Training - Mobile Field Force

Finding 3.2: Training - National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS)

### Area of Review: 4. Command and Control

Finding 4.1: Command and Control - Command

Finding 4.2: Command and Control - Control

Finding 4.3: Command and Control - Incident Command Post Operations

### Area of Review: 5. Internal Communications, Situational Awareness, and Intelligence

Finding 5.1: Internal Communications, Situational Awareness, and Intelligence - Internal Communications

Finding 5.2: Internal Communications, Situational Awareness, and Intelligence - Situational Awareness

Finding 5.3: Internal Communications, Situational Awareness, and Intelligence - Intelligence

### Area of Review: 6. External Communications, Public Relations, and Traditional and Social Media

Finding 6.1: External Communications, Public Relations, and Traditional and Social Media - External Communications/Traditional and Social Media

Finding 6.2: External Communications, Public Relations, and Traditional and Social Media - Public Relations

### Area of Review: 7. Operations and Event Execution

Finding 7.1: Operations and Event Execution - IAP Briefing

Finding 7.2: Operations and Event Execution - Personnel Accountability

Finding 7.3: Operations and Event Execution - MFF Deployment

Finding 7.4: Operations and Event Execution - SWAT Deployment

### Area of Review: 8. First Responder Wellness and Mental Health

Finding 8.1: First Responder Wellness

Finding 8.2: First Responder Mental Health

### Area of Review: 9. Community Relations, Partnerships, and Resilience

Finding 9.1: Community Relations, Partnerships, and Resilience

# AREAS OF REVIEW AND ACTION PLAN

## 1: PLANNING, PREPARATION, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE

### FINDING 1.1: PLANNING FOR AN EVENT: THE TIMELINE AND UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

#### Proposed Action Plan:

##### Immediate Action:

1. Special Operations should coordinate and collaborate with decentralized CPD units/intel sections and partner agencies to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence and information to improve situational awareness.
2. The CPD should continue hosting events with community leaders and members to foster collaboration and to address community problems and concerns.



*Figure 54. Community speakers and protesters at the State House (credit - Thomas Hammond)*

##### Near-term Action:

1. The CPD should consider resourcing a centralized intelligence section to provide increased capacity for collecting, collaborating, and analyzing intelligence and information for dissemination to personnel and department leadership.

##### Long-term Action:

1. The CPD should develop a Real-Time Crime and Intelligence Center to provide centralized coordination and collaboration of intelligence and information. This would involve utilizing a broad range of technologies to provide intelligence and situational awareness for the department. This resource would provide more efficient and effective policing by providing critical and timely information to personnel and department leadership.

### FINDING 1.2: EVENT PLANNING: INCIDENT ACTION PLAN (IAP)

#### Proposed Action Plan:

##### Immediate Action:

1. Develop generalized IAP templates in Alastar in anticipation of critical incidents and recurring special events. This will facilitate synchronized planning.

- Near-term Action:**
2. Begin conducting a deliberate planning process with designated personnel and use appropriate time management; specifically adhere to a 1/3- 2/3 rule, wherein 1/3 of the available time is dedicated to planning and the remaining 2/3 is for operational preparation prior to the event in question.
  1. Designate categories of events by size and complexity for Special Events to plan smaller/less complex events.
  2. Conduct planning for larger complex events using the Special Operations Division.
  3. Adhere to the practice of conducting deliberate planning with a dedicated team and use appropriate time management.
- Long-term Action:**
1. Train personnel to develop detailed plans through NIMS/ICS training courses (i.e. Planning: Emergency Operations, All-Hazards Planning Section Chief Course, Emergency Planning, Special Events Contingency Planning for Public Safety Agencies, Introduction to FEMA Operational Planning, Decision-Making and Problem-Solving, Event Security Planning for Public Safety Professionals, Web-Based, Incident Command: Capabilities, Planning, and Response Actions for All Hazards, Introduction to Homeland Security Planning, etc.).
  2. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX), at least once a year, to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand and can execute the process and plans. Utilize the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management as a planning and training resource.
  3. Educate personnel to anticipate actions and events during an incident, and to develop thorough contingency plans.

### FINDING 1.3: EVENT PLANNING: PLANNING TEAM AND SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

#### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:**
1. Ensure designated planning teams have the appropriate personnel to conduct thorough planning.
  2. Utilize the industry standard National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS) for Critical Incident and Special Event planning, and utilize the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management as a planning resource.

- Near-term Action:**
1. Designate categories of events by size and complexity. Special Events should plan smaller/less complex events; Special Operations should plan larger, more complex events.
  2. Plan events with a dedicated team utilizing appropriate time management.
- Long-term Action:**
1. Train personnel to develop detailed plans through NIMS/ICS training courses (i.e. Planning: Emergency Operations, All-Hazards Planning Section Chief Course, Emergency Planning, Special Events Contingency Planning for Public Safety Agencies, Introduction to FEMA Operational Planning, Decision-Making and Problem-Solving, Event Security Planning for Public Safety Professionals, Web-Based, Incident Command: Capabilities, Planning, and Response Actions for All Hazards, Introduction to Homeland Security Planning, etc.).
  2. Include other City of Columbia departments and directorates, and partner agencies, in TTXs to build familiarity and understanding of their respective duties and capabilities. Teach personnel to anticipate actions and events during an incident, and to develop thorough contingency plans.
  3. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX) at least once a year to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, the process and plans. Utilize the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management as a planning and training resource.
  4. Educate personnel to anticipate actions and events during an incident, and to develop thorough contingency plans

#### FINDING 1.4: EVENT PLANNING: CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING TERRAIN/LOCATION

##### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:**
1. Ensure designated planning teams have the appropriate personnel to conduct thorough planning, and planners consider terrain when conducting planning.
  2. Install permanent fencing around the CPD Headquarters and other designated facilities to provide necessary protection during future civil unrest incidents or other threats.

- Near-term Action:**
1. Gain access to the static security camera system located within the parking garage at Lincoln Street and Washington Street.
- Long-term Action:**
1. Train personnel to develop detailed plans through NIMS/ICS training courses (i.e. Planning: Emergency Operations, All-Hazards Planning Section Chief Course, Emergency Planning, Special Events Contingency Planning for Public Safety Agencies, Introduction to FEMA Operational Planning, Decision-Making and Problem-Solving, Event Security Planning for Public Safety Professionals, Web-Based, Incident Command: Capabilities, Planning, and Response Actions for All Hazards, Introduction to Homeland Security Planning, etc.).
  2. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX) at least once a year to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand and can execute the process and plans. Utilize the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management as a planning and training resource.
  3. Include other City of Columbia departments and directorates, and partner agencies, in TTXs to build familiarity and understanding of their respective duties and capabilities. Train personnel to anticipate actions and events during an incident, and to develop thorough contingency plans.
  4. Install roll-down security gates for the drive-in access points to the parking garage at Lincoln St. and Washington St.

#### **FINDING 1.5: EVENT PLANNING: DECISION POINTS/ACTION TRIGGERS**

##### **Proposed Action Plan:**

- Immediate Action:**
1. Develop generalized IAP templates for critical incidents and recurring special events in Alastar to facilitate synchronized planning; include predetermined decision points or action triggers for deployment of resources or predetermined responses from personnel.
- Near-term Action:**
1. Train and develop personnel to recognize and/or consider decision points or action triggers for deployment of resources or predetermined responses from personnel.
  2. Incorporate decision points or action triggers into IAPs, if needed.

- Long-term Action:**
1. Train personnel to develop detailed plans through NIMS/ICS training courses (i.e. Crisis Leadership and Decision Making, Planning: Emergency Operations, All-Hazards Planning Section Chief Course, Emergency Planning, Incident Command: Capabilities, Planning, and Response Actions for All Hazards, Decision-Making and Problem-Solving, Event Security Planning for Public Safety Professionals, Web-Based, etc.).
  2. Incorporate decision points and triggering actions into annual Table Top Exercises (TTX) to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, the process and plans. Utilize the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management as a planning and training resource.

## FINDING 1.6: EVENT PLANNING: LOGISTICS

### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:**
1. Develop generalized IAP templates for critical incidents and recurring special events in Alastar to ensure synchronized planning; include logistical planning, specifically for contingency operations.
- Near-term Action:**
1. Develop logistical estimates for required supplies or resources to assist planning future events.
- Long-term Action:**
1. Train personnel to develop detailed plans through NIMS/ICS training courses (i.e. All-Hazards Logistics Section Chief Course, All-Hazards Supply Unit Leader Course Orientation to FEMA Logistics, Planning: Emergency Operations, All-Hazards Planning Section Chief Course, Emergency Planning, Special Events Contingency Planning for Public Safety Agencies, Introduction to FEMA Operational Planning, All-Hazards Resources and Demobilization Unit Leaders Course, etc.).
  2. Incorporate logistical planning into annual Table Top Exercises (TTX) to ensure that the department's Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, the process and plans. Utilize the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management as a planning and training resource.

**FINDING 1.7: EVENT PLANNING: MOBILE FIELD FORCE EQUIPMENT**

**Proposed Action Plan:**

- Immediate Action:**
  - 1. Immediately conduct Protective Mask fit-tests for the new masks and issue them to Officers for use.
  
- Near-term Action:**
  - 1. Stage equipment for a rapid response MFF team at CPD Headquarters for contingency operations.
  - 2. Consolidate the remaining equipment at the CPD Annex facility in an environmentally controlled area to ensure longevity of the equipment, and availability for future deployment at a location away from potential protest areas.
  
- Long-term Action:**
  - 1. Continue to stage equipment for a rapid response MFF team at CPD Headquarters for contingency operations.
  - 2. Designate MFF officers for continuous issue of MFF equipment to provide an immediate response unit when on duty, or in the event of an emergency recall.
  - 3. Consolidate the remaining equipment at the CPD Annex facility in an environmentally controlled area. This will ensure the longevity of the equipment, and its availability for future deployment.

**FINDING 1.8: EVENT PLANNING: TRANSPORTATION**

**Proposed Action Plan:**

- Immediate Action:**
  - 1. Develop generalized IAP templates for critical incidents and recurring special events in Alastar to ensure synchronized planning; include transportation planning, specifically for contingency operations.
  
- Near-term Action:**
  - 1. Develop logistical estimates to determine what transportation and resources will be required for future events.
  
- Long-term Action:**
  - 1. Train personnel to develop detailed plans through NIMS/ICS training courses (i.e. All-Hazards Logistics Section Chief Course, All-Hazards Supply Unit Leader Course Orientation to FEMA Logistics, Planning: Emergency Operations, All-Hazards Planning Section Chief Course, Emergency Planning, Special Events Contingency Planning for Public Safety Agencies, Introduction to FEMA Operational Planning, All-Hazards Resources and Demobilization Unit Leaders Course, etc.).

2. Incorporate transportation planning into annual Table Top Exercises (TTX) to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, the process and plans. Utilize the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management as a planning and training resource.

### FINDING 1.9: EVENT PLANNING: REMOVING VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT FROM PROTEST AREAS

#### Proposed Action Plan:

**Immediate Action:** 1. Plan to secure vehicles, property, and facilities in order to prevent damage.

**Near-term Action:** 1. Consider Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP) in the event facilities are not usable after an incident or event (ex. protests, severe weather, etc.).

2. Determine which alternate sites will be used to secure vehicles and property.
3. Determine alternate sites from which normal operations will be conducted if CPD facilities are uninhabitable.



**Figure 55.** One of the burned out CPD vehicles is hauled away after the rioting (credit - Alicia Neaves, WLTX News)

### FINDING 1.10: EVENT PLANNING: RISK ASSESSMENT AND THREAT MITIGATION

#### Proposed Action Plan:

**Immediate Action:** 1. Conduct risk and threat assessment for events during the planning process, and develop mitigation measures captured within the IAP. This assessment should be inclusive of all threats and hazards to develop contingency plans.

**Near-term Action:**

1. Resource pedestrian bicycle rack barriers for use during events.
2. Conduct a risk and threat assessment of the CPD Headquarters to consider protective design changes around the facility.
3. Consider controlled access for vehicles entering the parking area of the CPD Headquarters.



## 2. EXECUTIVE DIRECTION: LEADERSHIP, COORDINATION, AND COLLABORATION

### FINDING 2.1: EXECUTIVE DIRECTION: LEADERSHIP



*Figure 56. Chief Holbrook addresses officers*

#### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:** 1. Maintain current operations.
- Near-term Action:** 1. Train personnel to plan for All-Hazard Incident/Event response through NIMS/ICS training courses (i.e. Crisis Leadership and Decision Making, Enhanced All-Hazards Incident Management/Unified Command, Disaster Management for Public Services, etc.). The goal for the department is to take the overall objectives outlined by senior leadership and develop them into a viable plan that is synchronized throughout the city government.
- Long-term Action:** 1. Incorporate leadership planning into annual Table Top Exercises (TTX) to ensure that the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, the process and plans. Utilize the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management as a planning and training resource.

## FINDING 2.2: EXECUTIVE DIRECTION: COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION

### Proposed Action Plan:


- Immediate Action:** 1. Maintain current operations.
- Near-term Action:** 1. Train personnel to plan for All-Hazard Incident/Event response through NIMS/ICS training courses (i.e. Crisis Leadership and Decision Making, Enhanced All-Hazards Incident Management/Unified Command, Disaster Management for Public Services, etc.).
- Long-term Action:** 1. Incorporate coordination and collaboration planning into annual Table Top Exercises (TTX) to ensure that the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, the process and plans. Utilize the City of Columbia's Office of Emergency Management as a planning and training resource.

## 3. TRAINING

### FINDING 3.1: TRAINING: MOBILE FIELD FORCE (MFF)

#### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:**
1. Identify primary and subordinate team leaders to provide additional platoon and team leaders. This will provide a successional chain of command and the capacity to rotate personnel in the event of unforeseen circumstances.
  2. Identify all MFF-trained personnel within the department, and ensure contact information and equipment are identified sizes (this should be predetermined to decrease time outfitting officers). This will allow for emergency call out and deployment in future operations.
  3. Conduct a review of MFF operations, roles, and responsibilities with all personnel.



*Figure 59. CPD MFF Officers secure a CPD vehicle damaged by rioters*

- Near-term Action:**
1. Conduct basic MFF refresher training with all trained personnel, focusing on individual training, but with some collective team training.
  2. Begin training all new and currently untrained sworn personnel in MFF operations. This will expand the department’s resources and capabilities.
  3. Train Command Staff and supervisors in basic MFF deployment and tactics. This understanding will assist with applicable planning and preparation for operations.

- Long-term Action:**
1. In order to provide better response and expertise, designate and train officers to compose a primary MFF team with grenadiers and command personnel.
  2. Establish at least a twice-annual training cycle for the MMF team, and an annual training cycle for all other personnel.
  3. Develop and approve a MFF SOP guide. This should establish standards for team composition and MFF training. It should also include CPD guidelines regarding the Use of Force, as well as what equipment and munitions are available for use by the unit.

**FINDING 3.2: TRAINING: NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)/INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)**

**Proposed Action Plan:**

- Immediate Action:**
1. Continue with the expectation that the department deliberately utilize NIMS/ICS for all incidents and events.
  2. Continue to use the Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer to provide a Common Operating Picture (COP); continue to use the Incident Management Board.
  3. Continue training and codifying the use of the system on a daily basis.
  4. Consider requesting support from CFD to assist in training personnel and to provide support in Incident Command operations. To date, the CFD has provided personnel to operate within the ICP, and these individuals have continued to provide excellent support.
  5. Utilize the City of Columbia’s Office of Emergency Management as a planning and training resource.

- Near-term Action:**
1. Train personnel in advanced NIMS/ICS or with function-specific training courses to build experience and knowledge in NIMS/ICS. This can be done online or through distance-learning.
  2. Identify leaders and personnel within the department to fill specific ICS positions during incidents or events to build in redundancy. The department requires a cadre of personnel capable of conducting Incident Command Post operations to sustain 24-hour operations for a minimum of 3-4 days.
  3. Operate using ICS positions in order to build familiarity with operations; this should include filling and operating Incident Command Posts to the expected standard so that personnel become proficient.
- Long-term Action:**
1. Train personnel in advanced NIMS/ICS or with function-specific training courses to build experience and knowledge in NIMS/ICS.
  2. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX) at least once a year to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand and can execute functions, processes, and plans. Additionally, include other City of Columbia departments, directorates, and partner agencies in TTXs. This will provide a mutual understanding of the respective capabilities of each group/agency.
  3. Continue to expect that the department deliberately utilizes NIMS/ICS for all incidents and events.

## 4. COMMAND AND CONTROL

### FINDING 4.1: COMMAND AND CONTROL: COMMAND

#### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:**
1. Continue with the expectation that the department utilize NIMS/ICS for all incidents and events.
  2. Ensure IAPs specifically outline the incident command at all levels, and continue designating specific assignments, such as an area or function for command. This will reinforce NIMS/ICS guidelines and maintain efficient command and control.
- Near-term Action:**
1. Train personnel in advanced NIMS/ICS or with function-specific training courses to build experience and knowledge in NIMS/ICS. This can be done online or through distance-learning.

2. Identify leaders and personnel within the department to fill specific ICS positions during incidents or events to build in redundancy. The department requires a cadre of personnel capable of conducting Incident Command Post operations to sustain 24-hour NIMS/ICS operations for a minimum of 3-4 days.
3. Operate using ICS positions in order to build familiarity with operations; this should include filling and operating Incident Command Posts to the expected standard so that personnel become proficient.

**Long-term Action:**

1. Train personnel in advanced NIMS/ICS, or with function-specific training courses, to build experience and knowledge in NIMS/ICS. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX), at least once a year, to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand and can execute functions, processes, and plans. Additionally, include other City of Columbia departments, directorates, and partner agencies in TTXs. This will provide a mutual understanding of the respective capabilities of each group/agency.
2. Continue to expect that the department deliberately utilizes NIMS/ICS for all incidents and events.

**FINDING 4.2: COMMAND AND CONTROL: CONTROL**



*Figure 58. CPD Officers conduct a briefing at CPD HQs*

### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:**
1. Continue reinforce the expectation that the department use NIMS/ICS for all incidents and events.
  2. Ensure IAPs specifically outline incident command at all levels, and continue designating specific assignments, such as a command area or function. This will further reinforce NIMS/ICS guidelines and maintain efficient command and control.
- Near-term Action:**
1. Planners should incorporate and ensure an adequate and flexible span of control so that command and control ratios can expand and contract dependent upon the type of incident, the nature of the tasks, and the hazards and safety factors attached to the incident. The optimal span of control is one supervisor to five subordinates (1:5). However, effective incident management may require ratios significantly different from this guideline, and personnel should use their best judgement to determine the appropriate ratio for an incident.
  2. Identify decision points or trigger actions to communicate to subordinate leaders and units to control actions. This will streamline decision-making for command and control.
  3. Continue using visual signals, such as white smoke, to communicate with and control unruly individuals, especially during chaotic incidents.
  4. Identify leaders and personnel within the department to fill specific ICS positions during incidents or events. This will build in redundancy. The department requires a cadre of personnel capable of conducting Incident Command Post operations to sustain 24-hour NIMS/ICS operations for a minimum of 3-4 days.
  5. Operate using ICS positions in order to build familiarity with operations; this should include filling and operating Incident Command Posts to the expected standard so that personnel become proficient.
- Long-term Action:**
1. Train personnel in advanced NIMS/ICS, or with function-specific training courses, to build experience and knowledge in NIMS/ICS. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX) at least once a year to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand and can execute functions, processes, and plans. Additionally, include other City of Columbia departments, directorates, and partner agencies in TTXs. This will provide a mutual understanding of the respective capabilities of each group/agency.
  2. Continue to expect that the department deliberately utilizes NIMS/ICS for all incidents and events.

FINDING 4.3: COMMAND AND CONTROL: INCIDENT COMMAND POST OPERATIONS

Proposed Action Plan:

Immediate Action:

- 1. Ensure the ICP is properly staffed for incidents by developing a local Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT). These individuals must be robust enough to provide adequate command, control, and communication, as well as planning and intelligence, during incidents and events.



Figure 59. CPD Incident Command Post

- 2. Ensure the IMAT is consistently staffed by the same individuals who should have focused functions. Provide some cross-training in other functions to provide flexibility.
- 3. Conduct NIMS/ICS and ICP operations during all incidents, including daily operations, in order to instill these industry practices as the standard.
- 4. Consider requesting support from the CFD to assist in training personnel, and to provide support in Incident Command operations. The CFD currently provides personnel to operate within the ICP, and these individuals provide excellent support.
- 5. Utilize the City of Columbia’s Office of Emergency Management as a supporting resource.

Near-term Action:

- 1. Train personnel in advanced NIMS/ICS, or with function-specific training courses, to build experience and knowledge in NIMS/ICS. This can be done online or through distance-learning.
- 2. Identify leaders and personnel within the department to fill specific ICS positions during incidents or events. This will build in redundancy. The department requires a cadre of personnel capable of conducting Incident Command Post operations to sustain 24-hour NIMS/ICS operations for a minimum of 3-4 days.
- 3. Deliberately operate using ICS in order to build familiarity with operations; this should include filling and operating Incident Command Posts to the expected standard so that personnel become proficient.

- Long-term Action:**
1. Maintain a core group of personnel for a local IMAT.
  2. Continue developing Command Staff, subordinate leaders, and specific personnel, in order to purposefully operate using ICS to industry standards. This will familiarize personnel with their roles during operations.
  3. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX) at least once a year to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand and can execute functions, processes, and plans. Additionally, include other City of Columbia departments, directorates, and partner agencies in TTXs. This will provide a mutual understanding of the respective capabilities of each group/agency.
  4. Continue to expect that the department uses NIMS/ICS for all incidents and events.

## 5. INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AND INTELLIGENCE

### FINDING 5.1: INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AND INTELLIGENCE: INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

#### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:**
1. Continue conducting IAP briefings with command staff and unit leaders to reinforce lines of communication throughout the organization.
  2. Ensure key decisions, such as changes to Use of Force, are clearly communicated to personnel.
  3. Adhere to the proper span of control to help ensure command and control in order to solidify lines of communication, especially in the case of larger-scale incidents that risk becoming volatile. Designate specific channels for communications to alleviate overcrowding during incidents or events. Ensure personnel understand which channels are secure in order to maintain Operational Security (OPSEC).
  4. Continue utilizing the Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer, which provides a Common Operating Picture (COP) for Incident Command and the ability to develop and share IAPs with incident responders. Continue incorporating this into daily operations.



5. Continue utilizing the Alastar Incident Management Board (IMB) to communicate in real-time with leaders and designated personnel, and incorporate this into daily operations.
6. Continue distributing intelligence and situational awareness information to all sworn personnel.
7. Ensure the IMAT is consistently staffed by the same individuals, who should have focused functions. Provide some cross-training in other functions to provide flexibility.

**Near-term Action:**

1. Develop IAP templates in Alastar for critical incidents and recurring special events. This will facilitate synchronized planning so that specific actions can be consistently communicated. Begin conducting a deliberate planning process with designated personnel to familiarize key leaders with the plan to improve communication.
2. Consider requesting Palmetto LECOM channels to provide secure communications for all agencies participating in, or supporting, the operation.
3. Deliberately promote leaders to utilize appropriate communications during daily operations; specifically, add a second communications channel during emergency or critical incidents to alleviate overcrowding on normal radio channels.

**Long-term Action:**

1. Continue developing Command Staff, subordinate leaders, and specific personnel to purposefully operate to standard using ICS positions. This will familiarize them with their roles during operations. Ensure personnel streamline communications throughout the organization.
2. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX) at least once a year to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand and can execute functions, processes, and plans. Include other City of Columbia departments, directorates, and partner agencies in TTXs. This will provide a mutual understanding of the respective capabilities of each group/agency.
3. Continue to expect that the department uses NIMS/ICS for all incidents and events.

## FINDING 5.2: INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AND INTELLIGENCE: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:**
1. Special Operations to coordinate and collaborate with CPD decentralized units/intel sections and partner agencies to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence and information.
  2. Continue using the Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer, which provides a Common Operating Picture (COP) for Incident Command and the ability to develop and share IAPs with incident responders. Continue incorporating this into daily operations.
  3. Continue using the Alastar Incident Management Board (IMB) to communicate in real-time with leaders and designated personnel, and incorporate this into daily operations.
  4. Incorporate partnering and assisting agencies to ensure access to the IMB and IAP through Alastar.
  5. Continue distributing intelligence and situational awareness information to all sworn personnel.
- Near-term Action:**
1. Resource a centralized intelligence section to provide increased capacity for collecting analyzing, and sharing intelligence and information for subsequent dissemination to personnel and department leadership.
- Long-term Action:**
1. Develop a Real-Time Crime and Intelligence Center to provide centralized coordination and sharing of intelligence and information. This center should use a broad range of technologies to provide intelligence and situational awareness for the department. This resource would provide more efficient and effective policing by providing critical and timely information to personnel and department leadership.
  2. Incorporate communications and situational awareness into Table Top Exercises (TTX), which should take place at least once a year. This will ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, functions, processes, and plans. Additionally, include other City of Columbia departments and directorates, and partner agencies in TTXs to build familiarity with, and understanding of, their respective capabilities.

**FINDING 5.3: INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AND INTELLIGENCE: INTELLIGENCE**

**Proposed Action Plan:**

- Immediate Action:**
1. Special Operations to coordinate and collaborate with CPD decentralized units/intel sections and partner agencies to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence and information.
  2. Continue utilizing the Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer which provides a Common Operating Picture (COP) for Incident Command, and the ability to develop and share IAPs with incident responders. Continue incorporating this into daily operations.
  3. Continue utilizing the Alastar Incident Management Board (IMB) to communicate in real-time with leaders and designated personnel, and incorporate this into daily operations.
  4. Incorporate partnering and assisting agencies to access the IMB and IAP through Alastar.
  5. Continue distributing intelligence and situational awareness information to all sworn personnel.

- Near-term Action:**
1. Resource a centralized intelligence section to provide increased capacity for collecting analyzing, and sharing intelligence and information for dissemination to personnel and department leadership.

- Long-term Action:**
1. Develop a Real-Time Crime and Intelligence Center to provide centralized coordination and sharing of intelligence and information. This center should use a broad range of technologies to provide intelligence and situational awareness for the department. This resource would provide more efficient and effective policing by providing critical and timely information to personnel and department leadership.
  2. Incorporate communications and situational awareness into Table Top Exercises (TTX), which should take place at least once a year. This will ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, functions, processes, and plans. Additionally, include other City of Columbia departments and directorates, and partner agencies in TTXs to build familiarity with, and understanding of, their respective capabilities.

## 6. EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND TRADITIONAL AND SOCIAL MEDIA

### FINDING 6.1: EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND TRADITIONAL AND SOCIAL MEDIA – EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS/TRADITIONAL AND SOCIAL MEDIA

#### Proposed Action Plan:

#### Immediate Action:

1. Continue to communicate using the various platforms available in order to provide accurate and timely information concerning events and incidents.
2. Continue to be transparent and tailor messages to foster positive and productive relations with the community.



*Figure 60. CPD Officers participate in new community engagement opportunities by attending Pop-up Peace Talks in partnership with Serve and Connect, North Columbia residents and local businesses*

### FINDING 6.2: EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND TRADITIONAL AND SOCIAL MEDIA – PUBLIC RELATIONS

#### Proposed Action Plan:

#### Immediate Action:

1. Continue with programs that have been instituted over the past six years to further strengthen public and community relationships.
2. Keep open lines of communication that facilitate dialogue.
3. Continue to support the following CPD programs:
  - *Assisting Columbia's Elderly*
  - *Beyond the Badge*
  - *Ceasefire Columbia*
  - *Citizen Advisory Council (CAC)*
  - *Citizen's Police Academy*
  - *Crime Prevention*
  - *Front Porch Roll Calls*
  - *Mayor's Initiatives*
  - *Project Safe Neighborhoods*
  - *Student Safety Tips*
  - *Victim Services*
  - *Youth Based Programs*



*Figure 61. CPD officers meet with residents during a Front Porch Roll Call*

## 7. OPERATIONS AND EVENT EXECUTION

### FINDING 7.1: OPERATIONS AND EVENT EXECUTION: IAP BRIEFINGS



*Figure 62. Chief Holbrook conducts a briefing with Officers*

#### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:**
1. Continue conducting IAP briefings with command staff and unit leaders to reinforce lines of communication throughout the organization.
  2. Ensure key decisions, such as changes to Use of Force, are deliberately communicated to personnel.
  3. Adhere to the proper span of control to help ensure command and control in order to solidify lines of communication, especially in the case of larger-scale incidents that risk becoming volatile.
  4. Designate specific channels for communications to alleviate overcrowding during incidents or events.
  5. Continue using the Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer, which provides a Common Operating Picture (COP) for Incident Command, and the ability to develop and share IAPs with incident responders.
  6. Continue using the Alastar Incident Management Board (IMB) to communicate in real-time with leaders and designated personnel.
  7. Continue distributing intelligence and situational awareness information to all sworn personnel.

**FINDING 7.2: OPERATIONS AND EVENT EXECUTION: ACCOUNTING FOR PERSONNEL****Proposed Action Plan:**

- Immediate Action:**
1. Use formal check-in and check-out procedures with a designated Staging Area Manager or Resource Manager, as prescribed by NIMS/ICS industry standards for large or expanding incidents/events, to account for personnel and equipment.
  2. Continue to use the Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer to track personnel for safety, and to communicate information. Continue to use the Incident Management Board (IMB) to communicate in real-time with leaders and designated personnel. Incorporate these systems into daily operations.
  3. Incorporate partnering and assisting agencies and facilitate their access to the IMB and IAP through Alastar.
  4. Continue distributing intelligence and situational awareness information to all sworn personnel.
- Near-term Action/  
Long-term Action:**
1. Train personnel to develop detailed plans through NIMS/ICS training courses (i.e. Planning: Emergency Operations, All-Hazards Planning Section Chief Course, Emergency Planning, Introduction to FEMA Operational Planning, Incident Command: Capabilities, Planning, and Response Actions for All Hazards, All-Hazards Resources and Demobilization Unit Leaders Course, etc.).
  2. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX), at least once a year, to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, the process and plans. The TTX will allow the department to rehearse and become proficient.
  3. Include other City of Columbia departments and directorates, and partner agencies in TTXs in order to build familiarity and understanding of their respective capabilities.

**FINDING 7.3: OPERATIONS AND EVENT EXECUTION – MFF DEPLOYMENT****Proposed Action Plan:**

- Immediate Action:**
1. Plan the staging and deployment of the MFF teams. Consider the most likely targets of protests when determining the staging areas for teams and resources.
  2. Consider providing increased flexibility with MFF teams. For example, double-up MFF officers in police vehicles with their assigned MFF equipment; this would bring mobility and faster responses.

**Near-term Action/  
Long-term Action:**

3. Stage MFF team members in the vicinity of potential protest targets so they can equip themselves and be transported into the protest area by CFD's MERV 1 or other assets. These staging areas should provide some security, or allow other personnel to move MFF officer's vehicles to secure locations.
  4. Continue utilizing MERV 1 for transportation and rehabilitation.
  5. Determine and coordinate transportation resources, such as MERV 1 or other buses. This may require memoranda of agreement if the resources are outside the purview of the City's departments and directorates.
  6. Pre-stage MFF equipment at CPD Headquarters. This will provide flexibility, allowing officers to access their equipment and rapidly respond to an incident, or allow officers at the headquarters to access the equipment as necessary.
1. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX) at least once a year in order to ensure that the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, the process and plans. Teach personnel to anticipate occurrences during incidents, and to develop thorough contingency plans.
  2. Conduct training in MFF operations with designated teams and partner agencies to improve communication and become proficient. Clearly establish responsibilities and tasks/purposes with MFF teams, partner agencies, and other specialized teams within the department to ensure clarity of task/purpose and avoid potential confusion.

**FINDING 7.4: OPERATIONS AND EVENT EXECUTION: SWAT DEPLOYMENT**

**Proposed Action Plan:**

- Immediate Action:**
1. Conduct deliberate planning to address the staging and deployment of the SWAT team. Consider the most likely targets of protests or incidents to determine the staging areas for teams and resources.
  2. Continue to provide increased flexibility with SWAT. For example, organizing SWAT into smaller 3-4 officer teams in SWAT Tahoes would make patrols more mobile and bring faster responses.
  3. Ensure SWAT's operational purpose and tasks are communicated to the team and to other leaders.
  4. Determine clear decision criteria for deployment and for triggering specific actions.

5. Determine clear decision criteria for deployment of the MRAP and for triggering specific actions; identify and train several drivers to drive the vehicle for SWAT.
6. Conduct a carefully-considered risk assessment to identify potential risks and mitigation measures, especially during incidents or events with the potential to rapidly move beyond reasonable control.

**Near-term Action/  
Long-term Action:**

1. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX) at least once a year to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand and can execute the process and plans. Train personnel to anticipate occurrences during incidents, and to develop thorough contingency plans.
2. Conduct training in MFF operations with designated teams and partner agencies to improve communication and become proficient. Clearly establish responsibilities and tasks/purposes with MFF teams, partner agencies, and other specialized teams within the department to ensure clarity of task/purpose and avoid potential confusion.

**FINDING 7.5: OPERATIONS AND EVENT EXECUTION: BOOKING AND TRANSPORTATION OF ARRESTED SUSPECTS**



*Figure 63. A CPD Officer escorts two protesters for booking after arrest*



**Proposed Action Plan:**

- Immediate Action:
1. Ensure that, as individuals are arrested during MFF operations, officers record the following information on a tag affixed to handcuffs:
    - *Arrested individual's name.*
    - *Arresting officer's name.*
    - *Offense for which the individual was arrested.*
    - *Date and time of the arrest.*
    - *Location of the arrest.*
    - *Injuries sustained.*
    - *Whether there was Use of Force.*
    - *Case Number: Individual Case or Arrest Under Emergency Order/Condition (i.e. Emergency Curfew due to Riots, etc.).*
  2. Conduct Table Top Exercises (TTX) at least once a year to ensure the department Command Staff and subordinate supervisors understand, and can execute, operations.
  3. Conduct training in MFF operations with designated teams and partner agencies to improve communication and become proficient. Clearly establish responsibilities and tasks/purposes with MFF teams, partner agencies, and other specialized teams within the department to ensure clarity of task/purpose and avoid potential confusion.

**8. FIRST RESPONDER WELLNESS AND MENTAL HEALTH**

**FINDING 8.1: FIRST RESPONDER WELLNESS**

**Proposed Action Plan:**

- Immediate Action:
1. The department must conduct a carefully-considered risk assessment to determine risks during planned and unplanned events or incidents. Leaders must immediately employ mitigation measures to ensure personnel safety and protect them from potential threats.
  2. Ensure personnel deploy with, and wear, protective equipment. Leaders must continually stress the importance of wearing appropriate uniformed clothing to provide protection (i.e. long-sleeve shirts, etc.).
  3. Encourage officers to maintain physical fitness through a fitness program. This will also reduce stress. Continue providing access to gyms to assist officers conducting with their physical training.

4. Conduct team training (i.e. MFF, SWAT, etc.) in a variety of weather conditions to acclimatize personnel and to instill confidence in officers' use of specialized equipment.
5. Continue to frequently rotate personnel during excessively hot and cold weather to allow personnel to recuperate; coordinate with CFD to provide additional recuperative assistance during operations.
6. Coordinate with RCEMS to provide medical assistance to protesters and personnel during planning.

## FINDING 8.2: FIRST RESPONDER MENTAL HEALTH



*Figure 64. Chief Holbrook and Sheriff Lott pray with officers prior to protests*

### Proposed Action Plan:

- Immediate Action:**
1. Continue training officers in the Post Critical Incident Seminar to provide peer-to-peer support after critical incidents, and to foster individual resilience. This will allow officers to have early access to personnel who can assist with any mental health concerns, and for Command personnel to receive an assessment of those concerns.
  2. Continue the Chaplain program as a resource for the department to assess, and provide assistance to, personnel.
  3. Encourage officers to maintain physical fitness through a fitness program. This will also reduce stress. Continue providing access to gyms to assist officers conducting with their physical training.
  4. Plan to rotate officers during critical incidents and emergency operations in order to provide necessary mental and physical

rest. Develop redundancy within specific teams and assignments to ensure personnel are not constantly assigned to the same tasks or jobs; this will also provide necessary mental and physical rest.

5. Conduct a carefully-considered risk assessment to ensure that the mental health of personnel is incorporated into planning, along with appropriate mitigation measures.

## 9. COMMUNITY RELATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND RESILIENCE

### FINDING 9.1. COMMUNITY RELATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND RESILIENCE

#### Proposed Action Plan:

1. Keep lines of communication open to facilitate open dialogue between the CPD and various groups in the community.
2. Maintain programs instituted over the past six years in order to continue strengthening public and community relationships, including:
  - *Assisting Columbia's Elderly*
  - *Beyond the Badge*
  - *Ceasefire Columbia*
  - *Citizen Advisory Council (CAC)*
  - *Citizen's Police Academy*
  - *Crime Prevention*
  - *Front Porch Roll Calls*
  - *Mayor's Initiatives*
  - *Project Safe Neighborhoods*
  - *Student Safety Tips*
  - *Victim Services*
  - *Youth Based Programs*



*Figure 65. Members of the Organization of African Unity SC commend Chief Holbrook and Deputy Chief Kelly for improving relations and building bridges among diverse communities in Columbia*



*Figure 66. CPD Officers attend a back-to-school event sponsored by @daybreakcola, and received 100 free book bags to share with youth in the community*

1. Continue to assure departmental transparency and clear communication of information to the public using a variety of means and venues. This will facilitate the department and the community working as a team to address problems and issues.
2. Consider holding a department Open House to allow the community to meet officers and to see the various equipment officers use on a daily basis.
3. Continue with National Night Out to continue strengthening community bonds.

# CURRENT ACTIONS TAKEN TO DATE AND ACTIONS IN PROGRESS

1. On May 31, the Special Operations Division began distributing a centralized intelligence bulletin to all CPD officers improving the department's situational awareness. The CPD has also improved communication and sharing of information between it and its partnering agencies to provide a more holistic intelligence picture ensuring better preparedness for any future events.
2. The CPD has incorporated the development of a Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) in its strategy for the past few years to increase its response to crimes, and the coordination and collaboration of intelligence and information. The department has collaborated with other City of Columbia directorates to efficiently use city resources, and most recently the city has refurbished an area for the new EOC which is planned to potentially support the CPD's future RTCC. The CPD expects to see this come to fruition in the near future as it continues to improve its services to the community.
3. Immediately following the May 30-31, civil unrest, the department's leadership conducted numerous weekly meetings with community leaders and members to increase dialogue concerning problems, and most importantly to correct any misinformation that was publicized. The CPD has also begun facilitating community relations programs that were postponed due to COVID-19 concerns.
4. The department has continued to promote programs to foster positive and productive public and community relationships.
5. The CPD continues the use of social media and traditional media platforms to communicate timely, accurate, and transparent information with the community.
6. The Special Operations Division has been designated as the lead planning section for large-scale events, and specific individuals are now identified as key planners for events to ensure thorough plans are developed and published within reasonable timeframes. The department has continued to improve its plans and has shown increased proficiency in the entire planning process.
7. The CPD conducts initial planning, assessments and coordinates resources to ensure the department is better prepared for events, and as part of this process, planners conduct risk and threat assessments to develop mitigation measures for events.
8. The department has drastically improved its Incident Action Plans, which began on May 31, after realizing some of the immediate planning shortfalls. Most of these were established as templates outlining thorough guidance, decision points, and triggering actions during incidents. As an example, during subsequent events the SWAT team was assigned specific locations for deployment and staging. Tasks and decision points for the unit deployment were clearly established and communicated to all team members and other leaders within the department to prevent confusion.
9. The CPD incorporated detailed plans and guidance for arrests during subsequent events, and these IAPs included key information for individuals arrested to ensure processing remains timely.
10. The department's plans have incorporated better logistics, and since May 30-31, the department has codified transportation within its plans during events with either internal transportation assets or through partnering agencies. During subsequent events, the MFF teams were assigned specific locations for deployment and staging with transportation assets also staged to move teams, as required. This included using CFD's MERV 1, or doubling up MFF officers in police vehicles to provide greater flexibility. Additionally, the SWAT team continues to use assigned transportation assets, such as Tahoes and the SWAT van, to ensure flexibility, as it is required for an event.

11. The CPD has included plans to remove vehicles and equipment, and it has identified locations to secure these, which is included in subsequent Incident Action Plans since May 30.
12. During the events following May 30-31, the department continually coordinated for assistance from CFD to provide rehabilitation and medical aid to personnel with specialized equipment, such as the MFF teams, to ensure they were able to recuperate from hot temperatures over the summer. Additionally, RCEMS has continued to provide medical services, as well, not just for officers, but also eventgoers.
13. The SWAT and MFF Commanders have prepared training schedules to ensure officers train in a variety of weather conditions to better prepare officers for future events.
14. Currently the City of Columbia has identified a few alternate sites to facilitate Continuity of Operations in the event facilities are damaged beyond use during incidents or events. However, there is a need to conduct further planning within the CPD to determine requirements for sustainment of operations.
15. The CPD is incorporating TTXs for its Command Staff and supervisors to train and rehearse for incidents and events. A TTX is scheduled within the next 1-2 months, and will include decision points and triggering actions.
16. The City of Columbia is researching the installation of permanent fencing around the CPD Headquarters and other key facilities to provide protection during civil unrest and other events.
17. The CPD has scheduled dates for issuing new protective gas masks to officers within the next 1-2 months.
18. The Special Operations Division has staged equipment at the CPD Headquarters for a rapid response of MFF teams, and the remaining MFF equipment is currently staged at the CPD Annex in a climate controlled facility.
19. The MFF has a draft SOP it is currently developing, and the MFF Commander has designated subordinate leaders within the MFF to provide better command, control, and communications.
20. The CPD has continued to enforce the use of NIMS/ICS on a daily basis, and to use Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer to provide a Common Operating Picture (COP) and the Incident Management Board. Additionally, the department has reinforced adequate and flexible span of control so that command and control ratios can expand and contract dependent upon the type of incident, the nature of the tasks, and the hazards and safety factors attached to the incident.
21. The department has expanded its use of Alastar by incorporating partnering agencies into the program to provide better synchronization and information sharing.
22. During the subsequent protest events, the department has also rotated leaders to various ICS positions to provide more experience, and to build redundancy. The CPD has also incorporated planning for 24 hour operations with personnel to fill required positions, and it continues to improve developing personnel for incident command and command post operations.
23. The CPD has reinforced providing adequate personnel for Incident Command Post operations, specifically intelligence. During the more recent events, the department pulled subordinate leaders with additional ICS and Emergency Management training backgrounds to become familiar with ICP operations, and to eventually provide the department with a local Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT).

24. The department changed its briefing format by briefing the subordinate leaders, who subsequently brief officers and personnel assigned to their locations or tasks to better facilitate communication.
25. The CPD also requires all personnel assigned or responding to the event to check in at a specific location, and to check out of the incident to ensure accountability. Additionally, through the expanded use of Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer, the department has the capability to track personnel, in real-time, through the Alastar phone application ensuring accountability and the individual's location.
26. The department continues to utilize the Post Critical Incident Seminar to provide peer-to-peer support after critical incidents, and to foster individual resilience allowing early access to personnel who can assist with any mental health concerns.
27. The CPD also incorporated better plans to rotate officers during critical incidents and emergency operations to provide necessary mental and physical rest. Additionally, key leaders were rotated through positions to provide redundancy, and to ensure personnel were not assigned to the same tasks or jobs constantly, which provide rest and mental resiliency.

## CLOSING MESSAGE

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The Columbia Police Department has a long and distinguished history of community policing that has allowed us to forge strong and meaningful relationships with the community at large. The mutual trust that establishes the cornerstone in these relationships is crucial for all concerned and the numerous programs already in place undoubtedly help reinforce and extend these relationships. Front Porch Roll Calls, the CPD ice cream truck, Coffee with a Cop, Cops and Barbers, Beyond the Badge, the Summer Job Program, internships, the "Ceasefire" Initiative, and the Citizen Advisory Council all help us connect with the community we serve.

However, a degree of mistrust persists with regard to the police, notably among young adults and members of marginalized communities. If we are to continue to progress, it is imperative that we actively engage with our citizens and listen to their views. We, as a department, must be willing to acknowledge our shortcomings and undertake meaningful reform through community engagement and changes to our policies and procedures where warranted. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, *"The ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience, but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy."* This is our time to demonstrate where we stand.

The Columbia Police Department is fully committed to transparency and to learning from the unparalleled and extraordinary events of May 30-31, 2020. We strive to improve police practice and, more importantly, to further earn the trust of the community we serve. Through this process, we firmly believe that the department and the community can move forward together to bring forth what will undoubtedly be a better Columbia.



# TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**Alastar Situational Awareness Viewer** - Alastar is a commercial web-based, online situational awareness software that improves the mission effectiveness of public safety agencies. The system provides agencies with situational awareness through a real time Common Operating Picture, and provides agencies an automated way of conducting incident management.

**Command** - The act of directing, ordering, or controlling by virtue of explicit statutory, regulatory, or delegated authority.

**Command Staff** - A group of incident personnel that the Incident Commander or Unified Command assigns to support the command function at an ICP. (Within Columbia Police Department the Command Staff includes senior leaders within the department.)

**Common Operating Picture (COP)** - A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command, agency or unit. A common operational picture that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all agencies and personnel to achieve situational awareness.

**Emergency Operations Center (EOC)** - The physical location where the coordination of information and resources to support incident management (on-scene operations) activities normally takes place.

**Hard Empty Hand Control** - Techniques that have a probability of injury, such as leg strikes and hand strikes.

**Incident** - An occurrence, natural or manmade, that necessitates a response to protect life or property. This may include planned events as well as emergencies and/or disasters of all kinds and sizes.

**Incident Action Plan (IAP)** - An oral or written plan containing the objectives established by the Incident Commander or Unified Command and addressing tactics and support activities for the planned operational period, generally 12 to 24 hours.

**Incident Command** - The ICS organizational element responsible for overall management of the incident and consisting of the Incident Commander or Unified Command and any additional Command Staff activated.

**Incident Commander** - The individual responsible for on-scene incident activities, including developing incident objectives and ordering and releasing resources. The Incident Commander has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations.

**Incident Command Post** - The field location where the primary functions of incident command are performed. The ICP may be co-located with the Incident Base or other incident facilities.

**Incident Command System (ICS)** - A standardized approach to the command, control, and coordination of on-scene incident management that provides a common hierarchy for personnel from multiple organizations to be effective.

**Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT)** - A team of ICS-qualified personnel, configured according to ICS, that deploy in support of affected jurisdictions and/or on-scene personnel.

**Less-than-lethal Weapon** - A weapon used to control a suspect's resistance through the application of strikes, blocking techniques, chemical agents or electronic control devices that carry a minimal likelihood of causing serious physical injury or death.

**Logistics** - The process and procedure for providing resources and other services to support incident management.

**Mobile Field Force (MFF)** - A mobile team capable of providing a fast and effective platoon- or squad-size tactical force for a wide variety of policing functions and missions, normally related to crowd management, crowd control, and civil unrest. This term also refers to the CPD Mobile Field Force, a specialized, highly trained unit of selected Columbia Police Officers deployed at the direction of the Chief of Police in circumstances of civil unrest or critical incidents.

**National Incident Command System (NIMS)** - A system that guides all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from incidents.

**Operational Security** - The implementation of procedures and activities to protect sensitive or classified operations involving sources and methods of intelligence collection, investigative techniques, tactical actions, counter-surveillance measures, counterintelligence methods, undercover officers, cooperating witnesses, and informants.

**Planning Section** - The ICS Section that collects, evaluates, and disseminates operational information related to the incident and for the preparation and documentation of the IAP.

**Public Information Officer** - A member of the ICS Command Staff responsible for interfacing with the public and media and/or with other agencies with incident-related information needs. (Columbia Police Department has Public Information Officers that interface with the public and media.)

**Reasonable Belief** - Reasonable Belief can be described as the facts or circumstances the officer knows, that are such as to cause an ordinary and prudent person to act or think in a similar way under similar circumstances. For the purposes of this Policy, the term "reasonably" shall mean "having a reasonable belief".

**Resources** - Personnel, equipment, teams, supplies, and facilities available or potentially available for assignment to incident operations and for which status is maintained.

**Soft Empty Hand Control** - Techniques that have a minimal chance of injury, such as touch pressure points and joint locks.

**Span of Control** - The number of subordinates for which a supervisor is responsible, usually expressed as the ratio of supervisors to individuals.

**Staging Area** - A temporary location for available resources in which personnel, supplies, and equipment await operational assignment.

**SWAT** - Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team is a designated law enforcement team, whose members are recruited, selected, trained, equipped and assigned to resolve critical incidents involving a threat to public safety, which would otherwise exceed the capabilities of traditional law enforcement first responders and/or investigative units.

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